

Betraying the Tradition: Dispositions of Thinking Through *Askesis* to Wonder

Traicionando la tradición: disposiciones del pensamiento a
través de la *askesis* hacia el asombro

ARTO TAMMENOKSA
ANTTONI KOIVULEHTO
TUOMAS LAMMI
(Tampere University)

Abstract: We find ourselves thrown into the world, enveloped in a certain context. Our behavior is to a large extent conditioned by this context and the inherited ways of thinking. Playing off the double meaning of *traditio*, we present a betrayal of the tradition of philosophy and customary ways of thinking, by shining a light on the tuning of modern rationality and proposing a way to challenge the modern technological understanding of being. As Heidegger remarks on several occasions, the attunement of wonder gave birth to philosophy, but has since been lost. We propose a possible way of confronting this issue, after the mood of anxiety has made us aware of the insignificance that lurks behind our habitual practices. This paper aims to show how *askesis* can enable us to revitalize the wonder about being, which we have lost.

Key-words: anxiety, *traditio*, attunement, wonder, *askesis*

Resumen: Nos encontramos arrojados al mundo, envueltos en un cierto contexto. Nuestro comportamiento está en gran medida condicionado por este contexto y las formas de pensar heredadas. Jugando con el doble sentido de *traditio*, presentamos una traición a la tradición de la filosofía y las maneras habituales de pensar, al iluminar la situación de la racionalidad moderna y proponer una forma de desafiar la comprensión tecnológica moderna del ser. Como Heidegger señala en varias ocasiones, la disposición del asombro dio origen a la filosofía, pero desde entonces se ha perdido. Proponemos una posible manera de enfrentar este problema, después de que el temple de ánimo de la angustia nos ha hecho conscientes de la insignificancia que acecha detrás de nuestras prácticas habituales. Este trabajo tiene como objetivo mostrar cómo la *askesis* puede permitirnos revitalizar el asombro por el ser, que hemos perdido.

Palabras clave: angustia, *traditio*, temple de ánimo, asombro, *askesis*

1. *Traditio*, its Delivery, and its Betrayal

What speaks to us in the tradition of Western thinking is the being of beings. By being attentive — by listening — to this history, we are attuned to beings and attain a *correspondence* with being in a certain way (GA 11, p. 19–21). In this correspondence, Dasein *dwells*. And yet, even though Dasein always already dwells in this relation to being, the appeal of being only rarely reaches us: “only at times does it become an unfolding attitude specifically adopted by us” (GA 11, p. 20/75¹). When we are functioning in a customary sense, we are always already attuned in a certain manner, we are attuned by how we understand the being of beings. Consequently, in a technological age the manner in which we understand the being of beings is technological: beings are disclosed to us as a standing-reserve (GA 79; p. 28–29, p. 33–34; Kiesel 2021, p. 699–700), and our manner of philosophizing is attuned to respond to technological demands, to a challenging-forth.

We are delivered a tradition of philosophy — a metaphysics of what the world is and how we as human Dasein belong to the world. The tradition of philosophy is a delivering-over² of a customary way of thinking — one that has been on its way since antiquity (GA 79, p. 33–34). The delivered tradition is that of technological thinking (GA 66, p. 16–18) — in the double sense of *traditio*, that of an inherited thinking, and that of a betrayal (GA 11, p. 10–11). Technological thinking, with its all-encompassing will to take stock of and control everything, is a betrayal of both being and Dasein. The tradition we have inherited betrays being in the oblivion of being, by delivering us over to technology. We, on the other hand, betray the tradition by asking after being once again.

If we were to truly heed the appeal of philosophy faithful to being, a correspondence would ensue: a setting apart, a clearing, a placing-into-relation with what is. This would mark a *dis-position*³ — an *attuned* openness — that the early Greek thinkers already shared (GA 11, p. 22). For them, *wonder* (*thaumazein*) named not merely a moment at the beginning of philosophy, but the fundamental attunement that *carries* philosophizing itself (GA 11, p. 22). Yet as an impetus, it quickly receded (GA 11, p. 22): it gave way to the rational dialectic of the Platonic dialogues and to the Socratic pursuit of clear determination. Here we project and sketch out a whence of philosophy, and a whenceforth that is topical to our technological age. We do this in three steps, namely, through exploring the manner in which the modern world is attuned, an ascetic attunement, and an attunement of *thaumazein* as

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, references to Heidegger’s works cite the Gesamtausgabe (GA) edition by volume and page number. When using a direct quote, we follow available English translations. In these situations, the GA citation is followed by the corresponding page in the English translation listed in the references (e.g., GA 11, p. 26/97).

² *Überlieferung*.

³ Here we draw from Heidegger’s characterization of disposition as “set-apart, cleared, and thereby placed in relationship with what is” (GA 11, p. 21/77).

dwelling. These constitute an examination of the tradition of thought which we find delivered to us, a turning away from inherited tradition, and a futuring of the tradition.

2. Attunement of the Modern World

Many of us within academic circles are quite familiar with people who conceive of thinking and knowing as neutral processes. Indeed, a large chunk of academic philosophy today is conducted with a high degree of confidence in the objectivity and transparency of thought. The ideals of clarity and certainty can be traced all the way back to Descartes' thinking (GA 11, p. 23-24). This confidence in objectivity and certainty has been challenged on many fronts, somewhat recent examples including Jacques Derrida's deconstruction and Michel Foucault's genealogical analysis. Influencing both Derrida and Foucault greatly, Heidegger also provided a powerful challenge to the notions of objectivity and neutrality. Like the aforementioned figures, Heidegger too was deeply invested in how language and history shape our experience of the world. Indeed, he provided us with many tools that one can utilize in calling into question the prevailing faith in objectivity and certainty. Furthermore, as a phenomenologist, he was keenly aware of the role attunement or mood plays in shaping our experiences. In this section of the paper, we are going to examine how different moods shape how we encounter beings within the world.

It might be easy to think that we often operate without any kind of mood influencing our decisions. This, however, is a misguided notion, according to Heidegger. In his view, we are always in some kind of mood (GA 2, p. 179). Moods are a major building block of the intelligibility of our experiences as they are what enable us to direct ourselves towards beings in the world (GA 2, p. 182). Indeed, the world is always disclosed to us through a particular kind of mood, and the mood determines how and what beings show themselves to us. This is especially noticeable when we are in a bad mood. When we are already feeling irritable, things we more often than not would welcome, such as running into an acquaintance at the grocery store, may seem like a nuisance. The entire world appears in the light of the mood we are in. It may be tempting to think that we can simply compartmentalize our moods and operate without one. After all, are calculation and scientific thinking not free of the corrupting influence of moods? Following Heidegger (GA 11, p. 24-25), we argue that even the most rational and calculated thinking is affected by our moods. Comporting ourselves towards the world scientifically, our attunement is that of interpreting it as a collection of present-at-hand entities to be quantified and analyzed (GA 2, p. 184). Science, let alone philosophy, is not free of moods. In particular, the mood of confidence is one that Heidegger (GA 11, p. 24) identifies as the defining mood, or *arche*, of modern philosophy. He contrasts this to the time of the Greek, when philosophy was ruled by wonder (GA 11, p. 22).

Wonder will be discussed more extensively in section 4 but let us go through some preliminary remarks on the matter to get a better understanding of the contrast between the mood of the modern era and that of antiquity. The Greeks saw wonder as the origin of philosophy (GA 45, p. 155). The mood of wonder is not to be conflated with our everyday experiences of astonishment⁴ or amazement, which are essentially different from the experience we are after (GA 45, p. 165-166). The Greek thinkers were puzzled by the very nature of beings themselves. The question at the inception of Western thought, then, is “what is a being *as* a being?” (GA 66, p. 271/241). This is the question that fueled the inceptual fundamental attunement of wonder. However, subsequently this question was approached through attempts to explain the conditions for the representability of objects, which has led to a covering-over of the inceptual Greek experience of beings, Heidegger observes (GA 66, p. 272-273). Wonder is, then, overtaken by mundaneness and familiarity of beings, as they become habitual and usual (GA 66, p. 273).

In the basic sense of the word, wondrous refers to something that is exceptional, or out of the ordinary. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, in the attunement of wonder, the most ordinary becomes the most exceptional (GA 45, p. 166). Here, Heidegger is, of course, talking about being. As the mood of wonder gets overpowered by familiarity, being falls into oblivion. Being is understood as beingness of things and is no longer seen as question-worthy. And this, in Heidegger’s view, is the situation we find ourselves in today. The prevalence of the mood of confidence, furthermore, is based on this same phenomenon. The being of beings is brushed aside with a shrug, as it is seen as the most usual and familiar. That is also a part of the reason why Heidegger is interested in things as they show up in our average everyday experiences. As Thomas Sheehan (2014) notes, “Heidegger’s phenomenological reduction is a matter of learning to stand thematically where we always already stand without noticing it.” In other words, being is the most usual, in that it is the basis of all meaningful experiences of reality. Therefore, one ought to examine things in their everyday modes of being, as they usually show up in experience.

In any case, let us put the question concerning the Greek experience of wonder aside for now, and focus on the prevailing moods of today’s world. The fundamental mood of contemporary thinking is hidden from us, Heidegger claims (GA 11, p. 24). This is a point where we may observe a shift in position between early and late Heidegger, considering the fact that he famously considered anxiety (*Angst*) to be a fundamental mood (GA 9, p. 111). We will forgo the possible exegetical questions regarding the Turn (*die Kehre*), as they fall outside the scope of the present paper. Instead, let us examine more closely the mood of anxiety, as characterized by early Heidegger. In *Being and Time* Heidegger writes: “For the most part the mood does not

⁴ *Thaumazein* is sometimes translated as astonishment. When we use the word “astonishment” later on, we specifically are referring to the fundamental mood of *thaumazein*, instead of the everyday meaning of the word.

turn towards the burdensome character of Dasein” (GA 2, p. 180/174). That is, during our everyday lives we generally are not consciously aware of the kind of being that we are. Most of our moods have the character of turning-away from the thrownness of Dasein. The mood of anxiety, however, brings us face to face with the altogether unsettling nature of human existence (GA 9, p. 111–112).

Despite their similarities, Heidegger is careful to differentiate anxiety from fear, which is also the root cause of the common anxiousness (GA 9, p. 111; GA 2, p. 245–246). By its nature, fear is directed at a particular being within the world. If we get to the root of our fear, we will come across a determinable entity that due to its threatening character causes us to flee from it. Although in colloquial language it may not be entirely unusual to use similar descriptions in reference to anxiety, this is not what Heidegger has in mind. What causes our anxiety is not any determinate being that we encounter within the world. Even if we try to point to the cause of our anxiety, we are unable to do so, because the source of our anxiety is our own being-in-the-world. Whereas our moods in normal day to day life make us turn towards the beings within the world, and away from the character of Dasein, in anxiety, those beings, and the particularities of ourselves, slip away from us into insignificance (GA 9, p. 111). In this space, we are left hovering with pure being-there. As the meaningfulness of beings escapes our grasp, we come face to face with the aforementioned “burdensome character of Dasein”. The anxiety that Heidegger is interested in, is a kind of oppressive stillness where, instead of fleeing, “a peculiar calm pervades it” (GA 9, p. 111/88). This is because in our everyday inauthentic existence, we “flee into the “at-home” of publicness, [...] we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein” (GA 2, p. 251/234). That is, in our everyday lives we are in a constant state of fleeing from the kind of being that we are. Despite our attempts to flee, the uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*) of Dasein, and the anxiety it brings are always boiling under the surface, waiting to pull the rug out from under us (GA 9, p. 118, GA 2, p. 252).

If we accept Heidegger’s diagnosis of the human condition, what kind of shape does this fleeing take? According to Heidegger, Dasein for the most part exists in the mode of inauthenticity, lost in the ‘they’ (*das Man*), and has fallen away from its authentic potentiality for being (GA 2, p. 233). The ‘they’ does not refer to any particular entity or person, instead, what Heidegger had in mind was more of a free-floating and impersonal construct (Mulhall, 2013, p. 68). When we are behaving in a particular way because that is just how one ought to behave, we are invoking the ‘they’. The ‘they’ relieves us from the burden of having to take it upon ourselves to make choices, because in our everyday lives we are all too happy to fall into the accustomed ways of operating in the world. Although this is the most common way we interact with the world, Heidegger argues that it is possible for us to bring ourselves back from the lostness in the ‘they’, and become authentic, even if it is only for a moment (GA 2, p. 356). Notably, the mood of

anxiety can function as the catalyst for such moments. As Elizabeth Ewing (1995) aptly points out, anxiety annihilates “Dasein’s unexamined identification with the ‘they’”. In anxiety, we are faced with the insignificance of the accustomed ways of behaving, and with the possibility of choosing our ownmost potentiality.

Where can we go from here? Our claim is that once anxiety has given us a glimpse of the groundlessness and the insignificance of our habitual mode of being, we are faced with an opportunity of making a choice, in that we no longer function in passively repeating everydayness, acting like one — *das Man* — ought to act. It enables us to act differently, should we choose to do so. Furthermore, it gives us the possibility of seeking a dis-position, through which we can rediscover the fundamental attunement of wonder by dis-placing ourselves from our habitual mode of operating in the world. One such dis-position, we argue, can be accomplished through *askesis*.

3. Withdrawing-practising *askesis*, *ethos anthropoi daimon*

The way in which we find ourselves inhabited⁵ into our world is such that we enact technological thinking (GA 66, p. 33–35). We find ourselves with purposes, with projects, with identities, so that we may place ourselves into a picture of the world, in a position within the world. This, however, is always already a betrayal of what, how, and where we are, a tearing of Dasein from a *here*, a presence to a *re-presence* and placing Dasein as *man in a world-picture* (GA 5, p. 89–91). However imprecise or machinated this tearing of Dasein from the world into a world-picture is, it is in a banal sense ethical, as it is always already a cultivated *ethos* of inhabiting — a habitual manner of dwelling.

The habitual technological mode of thinking functions, and as long as it functions well, it conceals from us our fundamental anxiety. Anxiety is the clue that leads us into rethinking how our everydayness happens in its presence. It liberates us to freely examine our *ethos* and thus to deliberate on a choice. Without further elaboration it would be presumptuous to call any choice one between what is good and what is not. However, Heidegger’s analysis of the Greek *agathon* may lead us to more fruitful tracks. *Agathon* means “good” in the sense that “it is done” or “it is decided”, and not in the moral conservative sense of “a good man, i.e. respectable, but without insight and power” (GA 34, p. 107/77). A decision is truly a decision only in the case where another decision could be made. *Askesis* as a withdrawing from the everydayness of tradition is a *dis-position* towards everydayness — what Heidegger would call a cleared, set-apart relation to tradition (GA

⁵ Inhabited, in that we do not simply passively inhabit, nor is the manner of inhabiting entirely up to us. There is a sway in which inhabitation happens, that inhabitates us.

11, 21). Continuing on the track of inherited tradition without a *dis-position* to and from it, without sober deliberation, cannot be a decision. Being at-home within a tradition, in its everydayness, is simply passively inhabiting it, whereas in a *dis-position* from a tradition, one *cor-res-ponds* to it, thinks along and from that tradition.

An attempt at serious deliberation of tradition was made by Heidegger throughout his writings and lectures — the first being the everydayness in the modus of *das Man*, the second being the shock (*Erschrecke*) of one's following of the first beginning of thinking (GA 2, p. 233; GA 65, p. 15). The first beginning of thinking, and therefore of philosophy, is what we are inhabited into, we inhabit and dwell within our customary manner of thought. This is the fundamental-ontological *ethos* of the habitual, and in this inhabitedness it is also a destiny — the more customary reading, which Heidegger opposes (GA 9, p. 354–355; Sloterdijk 2013, p. 161–162), of Heraclitus' fragment 119 *ethos anthropoi daimon*, “one's habit is one's destiny”⁶. The recoil from the shock (GA 65, p. 15) and disgust (in Sloterdijk 2013, p. 234–235), the differentiation from the destined quality of our first thinking — the inherited, everyday life — is a different *ethos*: a different habit of inhabiting the world. Withdrawing from one's inherited inhabitedness is what we may call *askesis*, both a withdrawing and a practice — a practice of ethics.

Askesis in its origin means practice or training, which in the form of ancient Greek *akademia* was enacted away from the *polis* — from *koinon*, common life — simply due to the logistics of establishing an institution outside the city being logistically more viable than within one (Sloterdijk 2013; p. 139, p. 147⁷). While Plato's *Akademia* was ascetically built outside of the commonality of the Greek *polis*, academic philosophy today may very well be simply an ornament of “culture” or “cultural industry” (GA 66, p. 50–52), a “philosophical erudition” that at best serves those in the seats of power. The “culture” which may utilise or discard philosophy as an ornament of erudition is the *koinon* — what is constantly available and understandable for all (GA 65, p. 107–108; GA 66, p. 194–195) — from which philosophy as *askesis* and the thinker as an ascetic withdraws, from being a *sub-iectum* of “culture” to being one who lives philosophy. This withdrawing is not a total negation of something, nor a movement from a place of immanence to a place of transcendence, but a sober deliberation of the habitual and common life — everydayness, *koinon*. The decision of philosophy is a commitment

⁶ Heidegger (GA 9) quotes this as “a man's character is his daimon”, whereas Sloterdijk (2013, p. 161–162) quotes the customary translation as “man's character is his fate”.

⁷ Sloterdijk brings the Greek *askesis* and the Latin *ascensio* together with an etymologically suspect move. As far as we can tell, Sloterdijk is fully aware of *askesis* and *ascensio* being of different roots, and actively chooses to bring them together regardless. Due to the etymological stretch, we here address only the connotations of *practice* and *withdrawing* while leaving the connotation of *ascension* aside.

to live philosophy and follow through with its consequences. In the case that it runs against the current of the habitual and common, so much worse for the habitual and common!

While the moment of differentiation is indicated in shock (GA 65, p. 15), shock is not an attunement in which *askesis* dwells. The grounding attunement of *askesis* is that of discontent. Discontent is the attunement that grounds freedom and all its possibilities: holding out the non-acceptance of that which is, in the way that it customarily is, opens up the breadth of being-otherwise, that of withdrawing from what is the everydayness of habit. The withdrawing-practising of *askesis* is a holding-oneself-out-into-nothing — an active effort of leaving one's habitual mode of being rest, and to be mindful of the wonder that there is *anything* instead of nothing; and of the possibility that there could be anything, anything else. In such an attunement of withdrawing-practise one retreats from the inhabitedness in culture, into a cultivating, mindful manner of being — practicing *askesis* as *transformative repetition*, instead of passive repeatedness, that transforms the *here* (*Da*) of being-here (*Da-sein*). The form that one's life takes is always the manner in which one inhabits, and the decision to be shaped by culture or taking an active part in cultivation is the event in which *agathon* is decided. One's habit is their destiny, and in customary habits one is destined to dwell; however, the here of one's everyday abode contains what belongs to one in one's essence (GA 9, p. 354–355) – the meaningfulness of being-otherwise, an uncanny dis-position to inherited tradition, and thus the decision on fundamental-ontological *ethos*.

4. Dwelling in Wonder

As previously noted, in the time of the Greeks, philosophy starts with a specific mood or attunement. Being appears for the Greeks as an astonishment. Astonishment, or wonder, is the attunement "within which the Greek philosophers were granted the correspondence to the Being of being" (GA 11, p. 23/85). This wonder is not a mere psychological state, like feeling awe, but a profound upheaval in an understanding of being: all that was once assumed and seamlessly integrated into a network of references is suddenly transformed into something question-worthy, asking: what does it mean that beings are manifest at all? As an *arche* of philosophy, an *arche* of thinking, astonishment is the risky *pathos* of philosophizing itself (GA 11, p. 23). In this attunement there lies a wonder towards the fact that there is something rather than nothing, that beings are united in being (GA 11, p. 14). Wonder draws attention and bursts the bubble of immediate presence or the on-going activity and, for a moment, we are being transported to somewhere where we normally are not. Or, perhaps, in wonder we come to be there where we always already were, but in an astonished mood, come to know it originally, or each time anew.

This "knowing" resists reduction to "knowledge", refusing to become mere "objectification" or "representation". It is a way of being attuned to what is, beyond conceptual grasp or intellectual categorization. Despite the pastoral undertones, the "familiarity" and "belongingness" here in question do not point to a closed harmony, but rather to the condition of human existence and situatedness. Being is concrete; one has to be "there" if one is to understand being in any manner. However, we have not chosen to be here, but rather we have been "thrown" into the world (GA 2, §38), in the midst of beings. Recognizing this contingency, that nevertheless is taking place, stirs astonishment and wonder. We don't need to go anywhere, because we are already here, where everything takes place. We *understand* our existence here — it does not feel "difficult" or "perplexing" to simply be, as being takes place as this "moving through". In this sense, it is familiar, the nearest, to us. Further, we *belong* here because this is where we must be, if we are to exist at all.

This kind of wonderful attunement of being "already here", does not mean that we would have nothing to do: that we should not try to gather knowledge about the world or that we should not try to change the world for the better. As the poet T.S. Eliot (1986, p. 48) remarked, "we shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time". We are always already in a world, but because of our "fallenness" (GA 2, §38), we "skip over" this recognition of being-there and concern ourselves mainly with beings, whether in the theoretical mode of the "present-at-hand" or through a practical engagement with beings "ready-to-hand". So, in our everyday life — as well as in our interpretation of the history of philosophy, of the history of metaphysics — we need to travel through this fallenness into beings back to being itself. We need to ex-perience (*Er-fahren*), that is, to "carry" or "venture through" the world but all that in order "to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time". As being-there, although we "do remain always and everywhere in correspondence to the Being of being, we, nevertheless, rarely pay attention to the appeal of Being" (GA 11, p. 20-21/73-75). We dwell in being, but only on rare occasions it "becomes an unfolding attitude specifically adopted by us" (GA 11, p. 20-21/73-75). One could say that only after this ex-perience of going through the unfolding of being, can we truly come to know the place (*Da*) of being.

What then stirs this wonder? How does being become specifically adopted by us? This happens through fundamental moods such as anxiety or boredom, engaging in askesis, but also in the "shock" of confronting the work of an artwork. "Work" here denotes that the artwork does something, it happens as an event that institutes wonder, that initiates thinking. This happening, taking place, is what we have to experience. In *The Origin of the Work of Art* essay, Heidegger speaks about the "thrust" (*Stoß*) (GA 5, p. 53–54) engendered by the experience of the work of art: that the very fact of the artwork's being-there rather than not gives rise to a certain thrust or a shock. Just as our plain being-in-the-world gives rise to an existential

experience of anxiety — an experience of *not* belonging to where we belong —, a confrontation with an artwork is an experience of suspension of the familiar and the wonder towards the fact that the world is there to begin with. In this sense, the work of the artwork is that of disorientation: the artwork keeps us alert and mindful, while it reveals that the artwork's being-there does not dissolve in usability, but always speaks to us anew. With this, it stirs wonder, and in its disorienting demands us to reorient and readjust, that is, mindfully pay heed to the presencing of being. As with the mood of anxiety or engaging in *askesis*, the encounter with an artwork holds the possibility of transformation — an opening into a wondrous disposition that casts us back into the world, where we might begin to dwell in a new way.

Through these kinds of experiences we can start to "re-member, to reflect, to re-collect" (*An-denken*) (GA 4, p. 83/108) being: a reciprocal process of greeting and being greeted, a correspondence, by the temporal unfolding of being. When being presents itself to us in thinking, we do not get an *answer* to the question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?"⁸. Here, we are not after a Cartesian certainty, the mood of modern philosophy of doubt and confidence, that has become the determining form of truth (GA 11, p. 24), but instead, we experience a *transformation* in our being — a happening that enables attention to shift from beings to being, from thoughts to thinking. This way we come to dwell in the vicinity of the Fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and divinities gathered in Things (GA 7, p. 182): in an appropriating event (*Ereignis*) of transformation into Da-sein, being-there, or more concretely, being-here, where everything takes place. The Fourfold is not itself a disposition, but it is the gathered world as it is disclosed in and through a certain disposition — gathering-together of the four, settled — if only temporarily — into a shared correspondence, that stays for-a-while (GA 7, p. 175).

The ontological difference between being and beings becomes present in the context of thinking when we think only about the actual contents of our thoughts (representation, "beings"), but we do not pay heed to thinking as a possibility (presentation, "being"). By reflecting on *what* I am thinking, I bypass thinking itself as an event — a process of questioning and opening — reducing it instead to the closure of an answer. But one could say that in the realm of the ontological difference, there is no need for an answer — not, at least, in the sense of a certain answer "once and for all" — because an appropriate question "suffices", is able to sustain wonder, and thus render authentic dwelling possible. Through dwelling, the correspondence "attuned to the voice of the being of beings" (GA 11, p. 25/93) takes place. This correspondence requires an openness, a clearing (*Lichtung*) — the space that separates us from things while allowing us to experience their closeness — that is the fundamental ground of our ability to name, to wonder, to question, and to imagine. In attunement of wonder and astonishment, what we mainly

⁸ Heidegger deals with this "why-question" extensively in *Introduction to Metaphysics* (see GA 40, p. 3)

confront, is the *excess* of being — the fact that, “being-ness appears in many guises” and “is revealed in many ways” (GA 11, p. 26/97).

5. Futuring the tradition

Our being is fundamentally conditioned by different dispositions. Dasein is always finding itself disposed, in an attuned *Befindlichkeit*. A wondering person is one *moved* by wonder — that is, displaced by this disposition (GA45, p. 169/146). Crucially, it is not that we are the ones “having” or “attaining” a disposition; rather, it is the disposition that transports us into this or that basic relation to beings as such. Heidegger is describing a fundamental *need* or distress that underlies genuine, primordial questioning — the kind that opens the path toward the question of being. This kind of primordial thinking can “affectively compel us only within an essential disposition” (GA45, p. 155/134). When Heidegger speaks of the “inner multiplicity” of a disposition (GA45, p. 157/136) — such as *thaumazein* (wonder) — he is pointing to the idea that even a single *Grundstimmung* (fundamental attunement or mood) is not one-dimensional. Instead, it is a field — a textured, dynamic space of possibility.

Thus, *askesis* as an example of a disposition that displaces Dasein into a particular comportment towards the world is a response, a correspondence, towards this need of thinking. *Askesis* displaces Dasein into a “between” of the usual and unusual (GA45, p. 167-168/145), but by this displacement, “man does not simply pass unchanged from a previous place to a new one, as if man were a thing that can be shifted from one place to another” (GA45, p. 160/139). In *askesis*, then, Dasein is not being moved into a another world or transcending *above* this one; rather, through a particular displacement and a disposition, man is transcending *toward* the world — placed “for the first time into the decision of the most decisive relations to beings and non-beings” (GA45, p. 160/139). In this “between” wonder dwells (GA45, p. 168/145). Wonder — understood “transitively” (GA45, p. 168/145) — does not just happen to us; it shifts our entire orientation. *Askesis*, as a force of transformation, touches upon how being discloses itself: it is a fundamental attunement that opens and sustains a particular mode of being-in-the-world, that is, *askesis* names a dwelling marked by a particular disposition, or attunement.

What is needed, then, is a retrieval of that original correspondence — a disposition no longer grounded in self-directed lived-experience (*Er-lebnis*) of the subject, but in the attuned undergoing, or venturing through, of experience (*Er-fahrung*) — where Dasein dwells and being becomes a questionable issue, that carries philosophical thinking. With this attunement of wonder, we would restrain ourselves (GA 11, p. 23), yet in doing so, we would remain held by what we *let* be. In this self-restraint, we might learn to see past ourselves, to step back into a *thaumazein* — a wondering disposition

once more. We would find ourselves returned to where we always already are — and have been, but having transformed in our withdrawal, only to return to a place transformed (Heraclitus 2003, §81).

While philosophy starts with wonder, the basic attunement of thinking in the “other beginning” — in futural philosophy (GA 45, p. 2) — “oscillates within dispositions” of restraint, shock and diffidence, out of which restraint is the “center for shock and diffidence” (GA 65, p. 14/14). In this sense, it is not a matter of going back to Greek wonder as if the transformation would come about in just starting to willfully wonder everything around us. Rather, in a restrained attunement we restrain from the all-pervasive challenge of calculative thinking, totalizing control and dominion, and attempt to cultivate a meditative reflection. In this way, we let beings be, but this restraint also allows us to keep ourselves open to “the meaning that lies concealed in the technological world: the openness to the mystery” (GA 16, p. 528–29/55–57).

The correspondence between human and being presents itself in language, but it is not a matter of merely taking up a Greek vocabulary, as we can neither return to this nature of language, nor simply adopt it (GA 11, p. 25), but to think what kind of relationship between language and poetic creation, would allow itself in our time. The recognition of the “secret kinship” (GA 11, p. 26/97) between these two, would point us towards a possibility of a building-dwelling-thinking (GA 7, p. 147–149), in which, even in our technological world, being would reveal itself as answering to reflective, mindful thinking — a dis-position from the one-dimensional calculative comportment.

Just as a house initiates its authentic being only after it is completed (when it gets dwelled in), philosophy today would not begin in wonder (à la Plato, Aristotle), but rather, its final goal would be wonder. This would come about through a fundamental attunement of restraint and releasement. A house is the outcome of dwelling, just as wonder is the outcome of thinking-philosophy. Futural philosophy — thinking — would be the enactment of wonder in dwelling. If science is the thinking of experience, philosophy would amount to an experience of thinking. In contrast to a subjective lived-experience (*Erlebnis*), an attitude consciously assumed by a subject in order to have or make experiences, this ex-perience (*Erfahrung*) of thinking as an affected venturing through, where being befalls us, where we would be exposed to “a thing, a person, or a god” (GA 12, p. 149/57) in a striking, wondrous, and transforming manner, would name the *arche* of a futural thinking to come.

References

- ELIOT, T. S. (1986). *Four Quartets*. Repr., Faber and Faber, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- EWING, E. (1995). "Authenticity in Heidegger: A response to Dreyfus." *Inquiry*, 38(4), pp. 469–487. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00201749508602401>
- HERACLITUS. (2003). *Fragments* (B. Haxton, Trans.). London: Penguin Books.
- KISIEL, T. (2021). *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon* (Wrathall, M.A. ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- MULHALL, S. (2013). *The Routledge Guidebook to Heidegger's Being and Time*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- SHEEHAN, T. (2014). "What, after all, was Heidegger About? ". *Continental Philosophy Review*. 47 (3-4):249-274. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-014-9302-4>
- SLOTERDIJK, P. (2013). *You must change your life: On Anthropotechnics*. Cambridge: Polity.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 2, *Sein und Zeit*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977. Translated as: *Being and Time*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson. New York: HarperCollins, 2008 [1962].
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 4, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981. Translated as: *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*, trans. Keith Hoeller. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 5, *Holzwege*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1977.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA7, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2000.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 9, *Wegmarken*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976. Translated as: *Pathmarks*, Ed. William McNeill. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 11, *Identität und Differenz*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2006. 3–26, "Was ist das – die Philosophie?" (1955). Translated as: *What is Philosophy?* trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback. London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003; originally New York: Twayne, 1958.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 12, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1985. 149–204, "Das Wesen der Sprache" (1957–58). Translated as: "The Nature of Language," trans. Peter D. Hertz, in *On the Way to Language*. New York: Harper & Row, 1971. 57–108.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 16, *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges, 1910–1976*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2000. 517–29, "Gelassenheit (30. Oktober 1955)." Translated as: "Memorial Address," trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, in *Discourse on Thinking*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966. 43–57.

- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 34, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*, Ed. Hermann Mörchen, 1988. Translated as: *The Essence of truth: On Plato's cave allegory and Theatetus*, trans. Ted Sadler. London: Continuum, 2002.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 40, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, Ed. Petra Jaeger. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 45, *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik"*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984. Translated as: *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic,"* trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 65, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989. Translated as: *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 66, *Besinnung*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1997. Translated as: *Mindfulness*, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary. London: Continuum, 2006.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin, GA 79, *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*. Ed. Petra Jaeger, 1994.