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Heidegger's Correlation Model of Being Human

El modelo de correlación de Heidegger sobre el ser humano

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Abstract: The distinction between contemporary schools of philosophical anthropology does not stem as much from the different anthropological basic determinations themselves as from the different modes in which these determinations are thought to determine human being. This opens the way to various models of anthropology (additional, transformative, privational, etc.). This paper demonstrates that the thematic core of Heidegger's early investigations—from the hermeneutics of facticity to fundamental ontology and the metaphysics of Dasein—namely the anthropo-ontological correlation, which is Heidegger's appropriation of Husserl's noematic-noetic correlation, relocating it from the realm of transcendental pure consciousness to the more original domain of factical life, entails a model of philosophical anthropology to which we shall refer as "correlational". According to the correlational model, human being is to be thematized not *per se*, as an independent subject of study, but in terms of a more fundamental anthropo-ontological correlation.
Key-words: philosophical anthropology, Martin Heidegger, correlation model, Dasein, onto-anthropological correlationism

Resumen: La distinción entre las escuelas contemporáneas de antropología filosófica no surge tanto de las diferentes determinaciones antropológicas fundamentales en sí mismas, como de los distintos modos en que se piensa que estas determinaciones definen al ser humano. Esto abre el camino a diversos modelos de antropología (adicional, transformativo, privativo, etc.). Este artículo demuestra que el núcleo temático de las investigaciones tempranas de Heidegger —desde la hermenéutica de la facticidad hasta la ontología fundamental y la metafísica del Dasein—, es decir, la correlación antropo-ontológica, que es la apropiación que Heidegger hace de la correlación noemático-noética de Husserl, trasladándola desde el ámbito de la conciencia pura trascendental al dominio más originario de la vida fáctica, implica un modelo de antropología filosófica al que nos referiremos como «correlacional». Según el modelo correlacional, el ser humano no debe ser tematizado *per se*, como un sujeto independiente de estudio, sino en términos de una correlación antropo-ontológica más fundamental.
Palabras clave: antropología filosófica, Martin Heidegger, modelo de correlación, Dasein, correlacionismo onto-antropológico

1. Introduction

From a traditional point of view, philosophical anthropology is a philosophical investigation into the human essence in order to find its *quiddity*. It is a subject area, a specific field of philosophy in which the human essence is *explicitly* thematized.[1] The central problematic of philosophical anthropology in its most general, indeterminate form, "what is man?", has been construed so far first and foremost as the more specified, more determinate question "what specific property does characterize or determine human being qua *human* being?". Hence, this philosophical investigation has been traditionally reduced merely to a quest for "anthropological constants",[2] or "anthropological basic determinations",[3] that essentially characterize or determine human being qua *human* being. It has been assumed that what matters most and constitutes the sole source of contention in any anthropological debate is introducing and giving a precise definition of an anthropological basic determination. Different schools of philosophical anthropology are thus formed according to the different anthropological basic determinations each proposes (*ratio*, intellect, self-consciousness, linguistic capability, etc.).

But when it comes to modern philosophical anthropology, as Matthias Wunsch suggests, the distinction between various anthropological approaches does not stem as much from the different anthropological basic determinations *per se* as from the different modes in which these determinations are thought to determine human being. In other words, in distinguishing modern anthropological approaches more appropriately, what matters most is the "how-ness", rather than the "what-ness", of the anthropological determination. Wunsch identifies four different paradigms of philosophical anthropology, or in his own words, "four models of being human", in terms of their respective determination modalities: traditional "addition model", Martin Heidegger's "interior model", Arnold Gehlen's "privation model", and Helmuth Plessner's "transformation model" (Wunsch, 2018: 471). The last three models are all examples of modern anthropology, each defined in contrast to the traditional anthropological model, according to which the philosophical conception of human being results from a synthesis of the concept of "animal" or "living being" with a concept of something extra-animal or supra-vital (*Animal* + *X* → *Human*).

By interior model—which he attributes to Heidegger and which is the central focus of this article—he means an anthropological approach according to which human being is to be determined from within human existence

[1] The emphasis has been placed on this qualification "*explicitly*", since one may claim that there are numerous instances of *implicit* anthropologies in the history of philosophy, particularly among various theories of knowledge. See Rentsch, 2003: 75.

[2] It is a prevailing traditional opinion that philosophical anthropology must formulate constants of human essential conditions, namely those properties of human essence that remain invariable across space and time. See for example Müller, 2010: 22.

[3] *Anthropologische Grundbestimmungen*. See Wunsch, 2018: 472.

per se, based on its own underlying constitution, without reference to any external benchmark, such as other living beings and entities like animals, or even God. Such an attitude entails a philosophical investigation which, according to Wunsch, is phenomenological in nature (*Pheno(Human)* → *Human*) (*ibid*: 473-4). He, furthermore, regards Heidegger's ontological analysis of Dasein as the most salient representative of the interior model, in which, as Wunsch assumes, the central concept of Dasein "is his *terminus technicus* for human being" (*ibid*: 474).

I endorse Wunsch's central idea (to draw a distinction between the nature of anthropological basic determinations and their modes of determining). I also agree with him that phenomenology in general, and Heidegger's ontological-hermeneutical phenomenology in particular, can legitimately be treated as an anthropological approach of its own. This is by no means a settled issue, nor does it command unanimous agreement; on the contrary, it is rooted in a long-standing historical controversy that erupted immediately after the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, as evidenced by Husserl's copious marginal remarks on his personal copy of the work (between 1927 and 1929), where he explicitly accused Heidegger of substituting phenomenology with philosophical anthropology:

> Heidegger transposes or changes the constitutive-phenomenological clarification of all regions of entities and universals, of the total region of the world, into the anthropological; the whole problematic is shifted over: corresponding to the ego there is Dasein, etc. In that way everything becomes ponderously unclear, and philosophically loses its value. (Husserl, 1997: 284)

This concern was further elaborated in his 1931 *Phänomenologie und Anthropologie*, where he explicitly addressed the distinction between transcendentalism and anthropologism (*Anthropologismus*) (Husserl, 1989: 164-5). In this lecture, he argued that grounding phenomenology in an existential analysis of *human Dasein* (*menschliches Dasein*) amounts to a flagrant deviation from the phenomenological reduction and its concomitant transcendental rigor, eventually reducing phenomenology back to the very anthropologism (as tantamount to psychologism) that he regarded overcoming which as the most significant accomplishment of his philosophical career (Blumenberg, 2006: 19).

This tension is further reflected in later phenomenological discourse, where the so-called *Anthropologieverbot* (prohibition of anthropology)—the term Blumenberg coined in his *Beschreibung des Menschen* (2007) to formulate the alleged essential inconsistency between philosophical anthropology and Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology (Blumenberg, 2006: 30)—emerged as a critical issue concerning the possibility or impossibility of phenomenological anthropology. Scholars such as Jean-Claude Monod have explored this prohibition in relation to both Husserl and Heidegger, emphasizing Blumenberg's later challenge to this restriction and his call for a reassessment of the anthropological dimension within phenomenology

(Monod, 2009: 6). Without delving into the matter, it is worth noting that both Wunsch's article and the present study can be contextualized within and understood in relation to this historical controversy.

However, my point of divergence with Wunsch's view rests on the way he interprets Heidegger's anthropological approach; he treats Heidegger's fundamental ontology in a way that it seems he has simply substituted Dasein for human being, thereby Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein implying an anthropological model he characterizes by the epithet "interior". It is indeed an epithet applicable to Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein, describing it very broadly; however, it lacks the precision and clarity necessary to grasp and capture the anthropological nuances of Heidegger's phenomenological approach. In other words, I maintain that Heidegger's phenomenological approach to the human being can indeed be called "interior," as it focuses on the phenomenological description of the experience of being human from within, rather than on an external comparison of the human with something other than itself. However, at the heart of this interiority, within the description of the lived experience of being human, emerges an inherent and intrinsic correlation that constitutes the thematic core of Heidegger's phenomenological anthropology.

In this article, I aim to propose an alternative interpretation of Heidegger's anthropological approach (with a focus on Heidegger's three key phases of early thought: the hermeneutics of facticity, fundamental ontology, and the metaphysics of Dasein), offering a rather more nuanced perspective that I hope will be capable of both adhering more closely to the true intention of his philosophical project and yet, reorienting and reframing it within the context of philosophical anthropology in a way that its essential, mostly latent, anthropological aspects come to the fore more clearly. Moreover, I shall argue that Heidegger's specific anthropological approach entails a new model of being human, not mentioned by Wunsch himself, to which I prefer to refer as "correlation model", rather than "interior model".

2. Heidegger's Onto-anthropological Correlationism

What constitutes the thematic core of a phenomenological investigation, as Edmund Husserl explicitly states in his latest unfinished work, *The Crisis of European Sciences* (1936), is "the universal a priori of correlation" (*Das universale Korrelationsapriori*) (Husserl, 2012: 172). Through performing the *epoché* and its associated *transcendental reduction*, a transformation of attitude takes place. This marks a shift from the natural attitude, which assumes all natural interests as granted by human existence in both life and science, to a transcendental viewpoint. In this process, "the" world is reduced to the transcendental phenomenon of the world, along with its correlate, transcendental subjectivity. It is through this subjectivity, in its conscious life, that the world attains its full content and ontic validity. What

is achieved by this process of reduction, accordingly, is a transcendental correlation between the world itself and the world consciousness, namely the conscious life of subjectivity (*ibid*.: 164-5). More concretely, phenomenological investigation takes the objects of life-world not as independent realities, but as they exhibit themselves to a subject, to inquire into their modes of subjective manners of givenness within this transcendental context.

According to Husserl's formulation within the terminology of *Ideas I*: "There is no inherent noetic aspect without an inherent noematic aspect specifically belonging to it"[4] (Husserl, 1976: 215). Roughly speaking, it means that every intentional act of consciousness (noesis) pertains to an intentional content (noema) specific to that conscious act. The task of phenomenology, therefore, is describing and analyzing the universal, a priori structural moments of the noetic-noematic correlation underlying all the intentional acts of pure consciousness, in which the objectivity of any object is constituted in its essential correlation to the subjective modes of its givenness to a subject.

Recent Heidegger scholars have notably emphasized the continuity of the phenomenological correlation from Husserl to Heidegger. Thomas Sheehan, one of the most influential figures in this regard, has persuasively argued across multiple works that Heidegger's entire philosophical project should be understood within the phenomenological paradigm, centered on the phenomenological correlation between meaningful presence of being (*Sein* as *Anwesen*) and the understanding of that meaning (Sheehan, 2005: 197), between being-as-meaningfulness and *Dasein* as *ex-sistence* (Sheehan, 2014: 257), or between whatever is open/intelligible and the apprehending of what is open/intelligible (Sheehan, 2015: 73). In his more recent article, he reformulates the phenomenological correlation also as a "dynamic space of mediation"; To quote him verbatim:

> Phenomenology, on the other hand, is *correlation-research*, that is, it is about the dynamic space of mediation "between" the human knower or actor and whatever is known or acted-upon. That space is the field of meaning, and phenomenology in its first moment is about the meaningful presence (Heidegger: the *παρουσία* or *Anwesen*) of what one encounters. (Sheehan, 2019: 50)

From a critical point of view, Quentin Meillassoux, in his seminal *After Finitude*, accuses Heidegger of being an emblematic representative of a form of the philosophical position he terms "strong correlationism"—a neologism with a rather pejorative connotation. By "correlationism" he means any current of thought that maintains the unsurpassable character of the correlation (Meillassoux, 2008: 5). To be precise, he criticizes Heidegger (both early and late) for inaugurating a radical shift from a Kantian weak version of correlationism that nevertheless allows for the existence of a non-contradictory

[4] It is the English translation rendered by D. Dahlstrom (Husserl, 2014: 185). The original German sentence is: "*kein noetisches Moment ohne ein ihm spezifisch zugehöriges noematisches Moment*", which, in a literal translation, reads: "no noetic moment without a noematic moment specifically pertaining to it".

thing-in-itself beyond human disclosure, to a strong version, which asserts the co-belonging (*Zusammengehörigkeit*) of Dasein and Being so radically that it renders the idea of any entity's absolute independence from correlation self-contradictory and essentially unthinkable. In Heidegger's defense, Markus Gabriel challenges Meillassoux's characterization of strong correlationism, arguing instead that Heidegger's correlationism is hermeneutic rather than absolute. This distinction allows for a form of realism that acknowledges the interpretative nature of human experience without reducing being to mere subjectivity (Gabriel, 2022: 544).

The entire contention over whether Heidegger's correlationism is of the strong or hermeneutic type aims to localize Heidegger's thinking in the context of the realism-idealism debate, a debate I do not intend to delve into here. Instead, I will attempt to offer an interpretation of Heidegger's correlationism that, I hope, will prove more relevant and significant from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. My aim is to show that Heidegger, by adopting Husserl's notion of the correlate and relocating its origin from the purely transcendental realm to the factical context of real life, opens up a new anthropological horizon—particularly regarding the manner in which human being is to be thematized. Heidegger's onto-anthropological correlationism, in my view, aligns with the specific parameters of a new anthropological model, which, in Wunsch's terminology, I have called the *correlation model*.

2.1. Phenomenological Hermeneutics of Facticity

Ab initio Heidegger's thinking revolves around *factical* life, the untheoretical mostly unthematized mode of our existing in the world, as it is "given" in our everyday experiences.[5] *Faktizität* is a highly recurring motif of the first phase of early Heidegger and remains decisive in all the subsequent phases of his thought-path.[6] In his lectures on phenomenology of

[5] The affinity with Dilthey's conception of *Erlebnisse* is more than conspicuous. According to him, *Erlebnisse* are inner states, activities, and processes that we are aware of or "lived through", but do not usually make objects of introspection. They are constituted within the context of factical "life"; as Heidegger puts it, Dilthey's inquiry into these lived experiences is oriented toward "the entire life" (das Ganze des Lebens) (GA 2: 62-3). More broadly, Heidegger's entire philosophical project—at least up to *Sein und Zeit*—is deeply influenced by Dilthey's *Lebensphilosophie*, which seeks an authentic understanding of life within its historical context. This influence is particularly evident in two fundamental insights: (1) the recognition of life as the primordial ground of all understanding, whose elucidation serves as a basis for the development of the human sciences; and (2) the conception of life as a dynamic whole, which not only manifests its intrinsic historicity but also contains within itself the structures and categories that make its theoretical articulation possible (Arrien, 2014: 124–125).

[6] The central role of facticity in Heidegger's entire philosophical project has been suggested particularly by P. Trawny (2003: 19 ff.) and T. Sheehan (2019: 46); the latter writes: "over the half-century stretching from the final draft of *Being and Time* in 1926 up to his

religious life (GA 60), he uses the concept *faktische lebenserfahrung* (factical experience of life) in order to emphasize that faith (as experienced in early Christianity) is a way of living in the world, irreducible to a theoretical construct and as such, is not to be treated as an object of theoretical consciousness. But beyond this, its importance lies in the fact that it reveals the meaning of history, "living history" indeed, through its historical character. "Factical life" is a life in history, it is historical and historically constituted in itself.[7] That is why Heidegger thematizes early Christian life, right from the start, not *per se*, but in its genuine experience of its own historicity, in terms of its original *factical* experience of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*). More precisely, the early Christian life is phenomenologically thematized so that the intrinsic relationship between history and temporality becomes explicit in the context of original, factical experience of temporality and time, since, according to Heidegger, "early Christian religiosity lives temporality as such" (GA 60: 80).[8] In this way, as J. Grondin suggests, Heidegger is in the pursuit of discovering a more original conception of time. Time will be interpreted no longer in light of the metaphysical ontology, but by taking the facticity of Dasein as its point of departure (Grondin, 1987: 56).

Yet, it is in the final lecture of this initial phase of Heidegger's thought (summer semester of 1923), *Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizitat* (GA 63), that an explicit ontological formulation of facticity in its intrinsic interrelation to human *Dasein* assumes the center of Heidegger's philosophical project. Here, as the very title of the lecture indicates, he uses the terms "ontology" and "hermeneutics of facticity" as essentially equivalent. This equivalency rests on the ontological character of facticity itself. "Facticity", Heidegger writes, "is the designation for the ontological character (*Seinscharakter*) of "our" "own" *Dasein*" (GA 63: 7). Here, "factical life", the unthematized, pre-theoretical "self-preoccupation" that inhabits every human,[9] is thematized precisely in its richness of ontological significations. Containing the dual possibility of revealing and covering ontological significances within it, facticity provides an original situs out of which any understanding of being

death in 1976, Heidegger never got beyond the issue of facticity. Nor did he want to. Nor could he have gotten beyond it, had he wanted to." (*ibid*.)

7 History, needless to say, is not understood here as historical science (*historische Wissenschaft*) or as a mere sequence of past events, but rather "as living participation (*lebendiges Miterleben*), as the familiarity of life with itself and with its fullness" (GA 58: 252, 148). Heidegger differentiates these two conceptions by designating them, respectively, as *Historie* and *Geschichte*, with the former having its ontological foundation in the latter (GA 2: 518 ff.). History and historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) lie at the core of his hermeneutical phenomenology, which seeks to uncover an original, pre-theoretical science of life.

8 Regarding the relationship between historicity and temporality, the following passage from *Sein und Zeit* is particularly illuminating: "The analysis of *Dasein*'s historicity seeks to show that this being is not "temporal" because it "stands within history," but rather that, conversely, it is historical and can only exist as such because it is temporal at the very ground of its being" (GA 2: 498)

9 See also Grondin, 1994: 347

becomes possible. Factical life is fundamentally an understanding or misunderstanding of itself, and hence, due to its ontological character, of being in general.[10] Facticity, in this respect, is hermeneutical in itself. Therefore, hermeneutics does not externally turn to facticity as an object of distanced theoretical interpretation, rather it arises from within facticity itself; it does not supervene on facticity as an extrinsic intellectual dimension, but it is inherently there as an intrinsic, inevitable condition of factical life that continuingly realizes itself *as* self-interpretation.[11] This self-interpretation of facticity is quintessentially ontological, because factical life—as "*in each case* this Dasein" (*jeweilige* dieses Dasein)—is ontological in its essence; it is "*da*" (there) for itself, as Heidegger states, according to the mode of its ownmost being "in one expression or another of the character of its being, and this expression, too, is in the manner of being" (GA 63: 7).

In his earlier lectures, therefore, Heidegger uses "hermeneutics of facticity" and "ontology", which for him is always tantamount to an "ontology of *Dasein*",[12] as synonyms. Stated differently, they reflect the same reality, albeit from two distinct standpoints. By taking the factical life in its entirety as his point of departure, he adopts a hermeneutical approach[13] for the express purpose of interpreting and revealing the structural and developmental inter-connexions of ontological significances intertwined into the context of our lived-experiences. In other words, facticity and ontology are thematized here in their intrinsic correlation. Accordingly, Heidegger relocates Husserlian basic correlation from its transcendental sphere of pure consciousness into the more original context of factical life, since it is here, within the context and through the experiences of factical life, that the ontological meanings and imports are initially constituted. Having been thus relocated, however, Husserlian correlation receives new fundamental aspects; it proves to be both historically and linguistically constituted, delving into which exceeds the scope of the present article. What matters most is that later when the conceptual precision required by a rigor ontological investigation gained the absolute predominance in the project of fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* (GA 2), Heidegger abandoned the vague, "ontologically undetermined" (GA 2: 67) term "life" conclusively; he remained instead committed to the terms "facticity", "Dasein" and "existence", whose ontological content is more determined and are

[10] Based on Heidegger's early philosophy, Scott M. Campbell describes and defends the idea that facticity embodies a dual potential—serving both as a vital source of insight and as a means of deception and falseness—which he characterizes as the intrinsic *factical ambiguity* or the inherent haziness of life. (Campbell, 2012: 6-7, 65, 157-9).

[11] "Hermeneutics of facticity", as Gadamer insightfully comments, is not a *genetivus objectivus,* facticity is not a mere passive object of the theoretical act of interpretation, but rather it is *genetivus subjectivus*, in the sense that facticity actively interprets itself and its place in the world. See Gadamer: 1987: 422, also Thanassas, 2004: 50.

[12] See Grondin, 1990: 164

[13] Again, heavily drawn upon Dilthey's *lebensphilosophie*, particularly his attempt to develop a methodology specific to human sciences (*Geistswissenschaften*). (GA 63: 14)

capable of reflecting the ontological connotation of "life", in Heidegger's conception of it, more explicitly.[14]

2.2. Existential Analysis of Dasein *as* Fundamental Ontology

Heidegger's primary objective in *Being and Time* is to elucidate the interwoven and circular relationship between *Sein* and *Dasein* from the standpoint of fundamental ontology. As it is later clearly articulated in his lecture series *Introduction to Metaphysics* (GA 40), under the title "The Initial Interpretation of the Essence of Man":

> As long as the question of being (*Sein*) interrogates not only the being of beings (*Sein des Seienden*) but being itself in *its* essence, a grounding (*Gründung*) of Dasein, guided and directed by this question, becomes entirely and explicitly necessary. And it is for this reason and *only* for this reason that this grounding takes on the name of 'fundamental ontology' (GA 40, 183).

Dasein's first appearance in the book *Being and Time* is made as the *primary* entity that is to be interrogated in the inquiry of being (GA 2: 9); this ontic priority over all the other entities is attributed exclusively to Dasein because of its being *ontological*, more precisely, *pre-ontological*, namely on the ground that it possesses an implicit, pre-ontological understanding of being belonging to its essence (existence) as an essential (existential) tendency toward being (*ibid*.: 20). Existential analysis of Dasein, accordingly, serves the principal purpose of a fundamental ontology (*ibid*.: 175), it has a fundamental ontological function (*ibid*.: 242). The exposition of the ontological constitution of Dasein remains only a way whose destination is to work out the question of being in general (*ibid*.: 575).[15]

Dasein, as the literal structure of the term itself ("*da*"-*sein*) reveals from the very first glance, denotes an ontological relationality; it is "there" ("*da*") according to its own ontological character. Heidegger sometimes refers to this ontological function of "*da*" as "transcendence", since Dasein in its dealings with intraworldly beings, not only relates/ comports itself toward (*sich verhält zu*) them, but also steps beyond (*übersteigt*/ *überschreitet*) them toward their being (GA 2: 481; GA 24: 91, 230).[16] Correspondingly, ontology is not the study of being as such (*Sein als solches*), that is, being *qua* being. Rather, due to its phenomenological character, it must thematize the being of beings (*Sein des Seienden*) as something toward which Dasein transcends understandingly (GA 20: 102).[17] A substantial portion of Heidegger's

[14] See Thanassas, 2004: 67.

[15] It is important to note that Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* ultimately remains incomplete, as the work was left unfinished. For a detailed discussion, see *Division III of Heidegger's Being and Time*, edited by Lee Braver.

[16] See also Pöggeler, 1983: 72, 83.

[17] Jean-Luc Marion refers to Heidegger's notion of phenomenological relativity as the

analyses in *Sein und Zeit* is directed towards and focused on this *Sein-Dasein* correlational structure. This is especially evident in its full articulation when Heidegger delves into the analysis of *being-in as such* (*das In-Sein als solches*) as one of the essential constituents of its *being-in-the-world* (*In-der-Welt-sein*). However, what he effectively does under this general heading is to provide a comprehensive and thoroughgoing analysis of the "equally original" (*gleichursprünglichen*) existential moments inherent in the ontological constitution of the "*da*", such as attunement (*Befindlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstehen*) (*ibid.*: 177).

2.3. De-anthropologization of Kant's Anthropological Question

In the next phase, known as the *metaphysics of Dasein* and exemplified by the book *kant und das problem der metaphysik* (GA 3), Heidegger interprets his fundamental ontology from a new perspective. Instead of factical life or being of beings, he concentrates on the ultimate question among Kant's four fundamental questions— namely the question of human essence, "*What is man?",* to which, according to Kant, all the other fundamental questions of philosophy in its cosmopolitan[18] sense must return—*in its intrinsic correlation with the fundamental questioning of ancient philosophy, namely the question of beings in general (die Frage nach dem Seienden überhaupt) (GA 3: 222).* By doing so, he seeks, on the one hand, to de-anthropologize Kant's allegedly anthropological question, i.e., to detach it from all its associated anthropological perspectives (both empirical and even philosophical), thereby liberating it from the constraints of anthropology (whether philosophical or empirical) as an independent discipline; on the other hand, however, to de-metaphysicalize the metaphysical question of beings, by reframing it as the more fundamental question of the meaning of being as such.[19] Ultimately,

"genitive" status of both being and Dasein (Marion, 1989: 107; 1997: 371).

[18] *weltbürgerlich*. In his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant distinguishes between two concepts of philosophy: *Schulbegriff* (scholastic concept) and *Weltbegriff* (worldly or cosmopolitan concept). This latter concept is of particular interest to him because it centers on the relationship between human knowledge and the intrinsic ends of reason; therefore, the cognitive achievements of reason are viewed in relation to their belonging to a unified whole (A 838-9/ B 866-7). In his lectures on logic, he states: "The field of philosophy in this cosmopolitan (*weltbürgerlich*) sense can be brought to the following questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope? 4. What is man?", and he immediately adds: "but all of these can be attributed to anthropology, for the first three questions return to the final question" (Kant, 1968: 27).

[19] Heidegger believes that this general pre-Socratic question of "beings in general" is ambivalent, oscillating between the questions of "beings in totality" and "beings as such"; the inner development of ancient metaphysics from its beginning to Aristotle corresponds to the movement from that indeterminate generality to "the determinateness of these two directions of questioning" (GA 3: 222); both of these more determinate metaphysical questions, however, presuppose the more fundamental question of "the meaning of being as such" (*ibid.:* 224): "What does being mean, which is already understood in every

he intends to reveal the intrinsic correlation between the de-anthropologized question of man and the de-metaphysicalized question of being.

Without such a de-anthropologization, the question of human essence would be and almost always has been understood in terms of subjectivistic, egocentristic demands of modern philosophy.[20] In the framework of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, the final answer seems to be found where he introduces his theory of "original and synthetic unity of apperception" (B 131-2), the transcendental unity of "I think" as a representation that must accompany all the other representations (Kant, 1998: 178). In his phenomenological interpretation of Kant, Heidegger locates the origin of this accompanying representation (transcendental ego) which Kant regards as an act of the spontaneity of subject (*ibid.*), in the synthetic functions of the transcendental imagination, that fundamental unifying faculty from which both basic faculties of human cognition, understanding and sensibility, stem. It is in this unitary underlying faculty, therefore, that the innermost unity of subject must be rooted. Behind every act of human cognition lies, as its constitutive substratum, the spontaneity of a unitary subject. Heidegger thus construes Kant's *transcendental* doctrine of "the unity of apperception" as tantamount to a *metaphysical* doctrine of an underlying self-sufficient subject, culminating in the modern "metaphysics of subjectivity".[21]

To avoid such egocentristic interpretation that tends to understand the question within the parameters of subjectivistic philosophies, as ultimately directed toward a self-sufficient, self-constituting ipseity, Heidegger takes three essential steps further:

First, he destructs subject form within the subject itself, demonstrating how the subjectivity of the human subject eventually reveals itself in something that goes beyond the subject itself—such as transcendence (GA 3: 206), auto-affection (*Selbstaffektion*) of time (GA 25: 151, 395), or even by adopting Helmuth Plessner's *terminus technicus*, "excentricity" (*exzentrizität*) (GA 3: 291).[22] He thus reveals the abyssal nature of subject in its in-

question?" (*ibid.*: 223)

[20] To see why this approach to Kant's anthropological question is not philosophically tenable, especially for Heidegger's critique of metaphysics of subjectivity through a radical subversion of subjectivity as equal to equity and ipseity, see Courtine, 1990: 64 ff..

[21] His interpretation, of course, is highly contentious. for example, Dieter Henrich (1994) and David Carr (1999: 34 ff.) consider Heidegger's interpretation to be an illegitimate departure from the true meaning and intention of Kant's transcendental project. Carr claims that the transcendental character of Kant's critical philosophy demands a fundamental distinction between empirical and transcendental subjects, not as two different substantial selves having different metaphysical statuses, but as a double self-perspectivity, namely an irreducible duality in the possible perspectives for describing the relation between the subject and its world (*ibid.*: 114-116); Henrich, argues that in the framework of Kant transcendental philosophy, the unity that can be attributed to the mind—therefore, the attempt to reduce all the faculties to a single power of the soul as their common root—always remains a possibility without any objective ground, even though it has subjective necessity (Henrich, 1994: 26).

[22] "[…] *der Mensch das Wesen ist, das transzendent, d. h. offen ist zum Seienden im Ganzen*

nermost essence, its fundamental groundlessness, its original finitude (e.g., GA 3: 218 ff.), and the original, transcendental neediness of its finite essence (*ibid*.: 75, 236).

Second, he reorients Kant's ultimate question corresponding to the basic problematic of his grand project "metaphysics of metaphysics" (*ibid*.: 271), i.e., "laying the ground of metaphysics in anthropology". What matters, therefore, is not simply to provide an answer (in the form of an anthropological system) for the question of man, but to ask how man must and can be questioned in the process of laying the foundation of metaphysics in general. "The questionability of questioning about human is the problematic that comes to light in the course of Kant's laying the foundation of metaphysics." (*ibid*.: 215)

Third, he does the same with the basic problem of metaphysics in order to bring to light the essential connection that exists between being as such and human finitude (*ibid*.: 221-2). When the question of being is posed not as the question of the being of beings, but rather as the question of being as such, then it leads to a more original question of *from whence* something like being as such is to be comprehended at all (*ibid*.: 224). The question of being thus is driven back to the question concerning the inner possibility and the essence of the understanding of being as such, which is a "decisive possibility of human Dasein" (*ibid*.: 225), or more precisely, "the finitude of Dasein in him" (*ibid*.: 229). Therefore, this question cannot be anthropological since man is only man on the grounds of the Dasein in him, which is more original than man. "All anthropology, even Philosophical Anthropology, has already assumed that man is man" (*ibid*.: 229-30).

In these three steps Heidegger accomplishes a radical de-anthropologization of Kant's ultimate question concerning human essence. To quote him verbatim:

> "It demands a radical, renewed unveiling of the grounds for the possibility of metaphysics as natural disposition of human beings, i.e., a metaphysics of Dasein directed at the possibility of metaphysics as such, which must pose the question concerning the essence of human beings in a way which is prior to all philosophical anthropology and cultural philosophy." (*ibid*.: 273)

2.4. Metaphysics of Dasein

Thus, the two Kantian tasks—laying the ground of metaphysics and anthropological inquiry—are shown to be interwoven, forming the warp and weft of a single unified intellectual project, by demonstrating how their central questions—"*What is the meaning of being as such?"* and "*What is man?"*—are intrinsically interconnected; more precisely, how they derive

und zu sich selbst, daß der Mensch durch diesen exzentrischen Charakter zugleich auch hineingestellt wird in das Ganze des Seienden überhaupt — und daß nur so die Frage und die Idee einer philosophischen Anthropologie Sinn hat." (GA 3: 291)

their determination and ultimate orientation from one another. In the introduction to his final lecture course in Marburg, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (GA 26), Heidegger states with rare detail and clarity that the question of the foundation of philosophy (the Aristotelian question of *prima philosophia*) and the question concerning human essence are essentially the same questions: "The fundamental question of philosophy, the question about being (*die Frage nach dem Sein*), is in itself the question about man, properly understood (*die rechtverstandene Frage nach dem Menschen*)" (GA 26: 20) Also:

> "The understanding of being is not merely one capability among others; it is the fundamental condition for the possibility of *Dasein* as such. Since it belongs to the essential constitution of man to understand being, the question about being [...] is a question, but indeed *the very* question about man itself." (*ibid.*)

Now, based on this reciprocal relationship between the basic ontological and anthropological directions of questioning, Heidegger's metaphysics of Dasein can be formulated in terms of a process that takes as its *terminus a quo* an ontological anthropology—an anthropology that is essentially ontological in its fundamental orientation—toward an anthropological ontology—an ontology which is essentially anthropological in its fundamental orientation—as its *terminus ad quem*.



Figure 1. Metaphysics of Dasein as a correlation between ontological anthropology and anthropological ontology

What is prescribed at this level is to establish the metaphysics of Dasein explicitly and intentionally based on a correlation between ontological anthropology and anthropological ontology. This normative methodological formulation, however, relies on an insight into the nature of any ontological and anthropological investigations; every ontological theory is constructed inevitably under the implicit influence of certain basic anthropological theories and concepts; that is, in every ontological interpretation of the being

of beings, a prior understanding of specific anthropological presuppositions is implied, and vice versa. Of course, this is a general claim and is not limited to the fundamental ontology or the metaphysics of Dasein (particularly, Heidegger's reading of modern philosophy as the "metaphysics of subjectivity" reflects this meaning).

To put it more precisely, we can formulate this reciprocal influence at three actually intertwined, yet analytically distinguishable levels:[23]

- **Semantic correlation:** which indicates the often-implicit semantic determination of the basic terms and concepts of one domain through presuppositions related to another domain. Anthropological fundamental concepts derive their meaning partly from implicit ontological presuppositions and theories. Similarly, ontological fundamental concepts derive their meaning partly from implicit anthropological presuppositions and theories.
- **Hermeneutic correlation**: which indicates that the phenomena of one domain are interpreted in light of the pre-understandings from another domain. In the interpretation of anthropological phenomena, ontological pre-understandings have a direct influence, and vice versa.
- **Transcendental correlation:** which indicates that the general understandings related to one domain function as conditions for the possibility of encountering phenomena from another domain. Within the framework of a particular ontological understanding, the possibility of encountering certain anthropological phenomena arises, while others do not come into contact at all. The reverse is also true: within the framework of a particular anthropological understanding, the encounter with certain ontological phenomena becomes possible, while others remain outside the realm of contact.

Through his reading of the history of philosophy under the rubric of "destruction of the history of ontology" (GA 2: 27), but particularly in his later reading of modern philosophy,[24] Heidegger has sought, among other things, to bring these latent levels of mutual influences more or less into view. From this perspective, modern philosophy is revealed to be, at its core, a "metaphysics of subjectivity", reflecting the correlation between an egocentric, subjectivistic anthropology and Christian metaphysical-theological ontology in its fundamental characteristics—reification, metaphysical

[23] The following distinction is the author's own and does not originate from Heidegger.

[24] *Destruktion* in Heidegger's terminology is used not in the negative meaning of the "shaking off the ontological tradition", but in the sense of revealing its positive possibilities (GA 2: 30-1). As David Carr suggests Heidegger's "destruction" project in *Bing and Time* is not entirely consistent with his later focus on the history of philosophy, as the former presupposes a distinction between doing ontology and critically reading its history, making the latter ancillary to the former, while this distinction vanishes in his late works (Carr, 1999: 11-12).

anthropomorphism, and the anthropo-onto-theology (Heidegger, GA 41: 111-112). Having elucidated this anthropological and metaphysical correlation, which often remains concealed and obscure, he incorporates it into his fundamental ontology and metaphysics of Dasein as a key methodological principle, which demands that the anthropological and the ontological questions are to be formulated in correlation to one another and derive their initial orientations and final determinations from each other. Without this explicit correlation, which manifests itself in the formulation and orientation of fundamental questions, neither fundamental ontology nor metaphysics of Dasein would take shape at all.

Before proceeding to the next section, and in order to clarify any potential ambiguity or misunderstanding, it will be helpful to briefly recap the path we have taken thus far regarding the concept of correlation. We have examined the onto-anthropological correlation on three distinct levels: first, the *thematic* correlation, which refers to the intrinsic co-belonging of factical life (*Dasein*) and Being (*Sein*); second, the *interrogatory* correlation, which entails that the anthropological and ontological questions mutually determine one another; and third, the *disciplinary* correlation, which posits that philosophical anthropology and ontology, as distinct disciplines, must be grounded in relation to one another.

One might view these three as separate types or concepts of correlation, or alternatively, as three different levels of correlation—namely, in terms of concepts, questions, and disciplines. Another important question arises as to whether the term "correlation" is being used equivocally or univocally in this context, and whether there is an entailment relationship between these different correlations. Does one type of correlation necessarily lead to the others? While I do not intend to fully address these questions here, it is at least clear that the assertion that Heidegger's concept of correlation is a continuation of Husserl's can be defended with a considerable degree of justification—particularly at the level of the thematic correlation.

3. Correlation Model

By pursuing Heidegger's thought trajectory in his pre-turn periods, as roughly depicted above, it becomes evident that what constitutes the thematic core of his phenomenological investigations, as an extension of Husserl's one, is exactly an onto-anthropological correlation; by appealing to Sheehan's topological metaphor—"dynamic space of mediation" (Sheehan, 2019: 50)—it can be envisaged as a gestalt or configuration of onto-anthropological interconnections forming a unified whole irreducible to its individual moments, but contrariwise, it is these moments that are constituted in their mutual co-determination, namely their determinations are derived from the

correlational nexus in which they are embedded.[25] In this respect, the existential analysis of Dasein should not be considered merely equivalent to a philosophical—let alone empirical—anthropology as an independent discipline. As Heidegger explicitly states, it does not pose the question of human essence within the framework of anthropological problematization, which seeks to thematize human being exclusively *qua* human being, treating it as an essentially independent subject of investigation. His fundamental ontology, or metaphysics of Dasein, by contrast, interrogates the human in light of something more primordial than the human itself—something that constitutes the very basis of being human and which he refers to as "Dasein". It provides, yet, a general constitutive background of framework for setting up a *genuine* philosophical anthropology, fully aware of the derivative character of its proper thematic field and thus its own derivative status.

Correlational anthropology is a prominent example of such a genuine anthropology. It posits a fundamental correlation as the constitutive underlying reality upon which the human being "supervenes", subsequently thematizing the human being as a derivative of this foundational correlation. We observed that Husserl's entire domain of pure consciousness is fully characterized by universal and a priori noetic-noematic correlations. Similarly, we can suggest that for Heidegger too, the entirety of the human realm is determined and characterized by anthropo-ontological correlations.

To provide a conceptual visualization, let us consider a geometric metaphor, known as stereographic projection. Imagine each anthropo-ontological correlation as geometrically representing a geodesic on the surface of a sphere structured around the fundamental correlation between *Sein* and *Dasein* envisioned as representing the main axis connecting the north and south poles of that sphere. The space produced by all these possible anthropo-ontological geodesics, therefore, can be imagined as the entire surface of that *Sein-Dasein* sphere. Now, imagine that we project the whole surface of the sphere onto a plane along the rays emanating from the sphere's north pole (as shown in Figure 2). In this case, every point on the sphere's surface

[25] This movement from a fundamental correlation as a seemingly simple, isolated reciprocal relationship, to a dynamic space of mediation as a field of tension, is less a gap in reasoning and more a matter of articulation. While Husserl's phenomenological correlation primarily focuses on the *mind-world* relation, my intention is to suggest that this correlation can be understood within a more complex framework—one that reflects a richer, co-founding nexus of correlations. Furthermore, given the discussion of *parthood* in this context, it is worth noting that early Heidegger's conception of parts and wholes can be traced back to Husserl's *Third Logical Investigation*. This connection has been explored in recent scholarship, particularly regarding the mereological dimensions of *Mitsein* in *Being and Time*. For further insights, see Noam Cohen's analysis of Heidegger's mereology of *Mitsein* and Einar Øverenget's examination of Husserl's influence on Heidegger's phenomenology of parts and wholes. See: Cohen, N. (2024). Being-there, being-with, and being-a-part: Heidegger's mereology of *Mitsein* in *Being and Time*. *Inquiry*. Øverenget, E. (1996). The presence of Husserl's theory of wholes and parts in Heidegger's phenomenology. *Research in Phenomenology*, *26*(1), 171–197.

(except for the north pole) corresponds to a point on the plane. Conversely, we can say that each point on the plane is a projected point of the sphere's surface. In this way, these two spaces (the sphere's surface and the projected plane) are, so to speak, *homeomorphic*; they have the same topological infrastructures, with different geometrical superstructures though. This geometric metaphor allows us to conceive of the entirety of the human dimension—encompassing culture, civilization, and more—as a projected image of the sphere of anthropo-ontological correlations. As the metaphor suggests, every anthropological determination reflects, at its core, a determination of that foundational *Sein-Dasein* correlation, without losing its correlational quality, nevertheless.



Figure 2. Human dimension as a projective image of the sphere of anthropo-ontological correlations via a stereographic projection[26]

To conceptualize the human dimension—henceforth referred to as *anthropological space*—as homomorphic to the correlational onto-anthropological space, an alternative anthropological approach is required. This

[26] Howison, M. (Original creator), & CheChe (Derivative work). (n.d.). *Stereographic projection in 3D* [Modified 3D illustration]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stereographic_projection_in_3D.png. Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

approach demands a fundamentally different mode of conceptualization, along with a corresponding conceptual apparatus capable of reflecting its intrinsic correlations. It necessitates *correlational concepts* whose intension can effectively grasp and capture the inherent polar interactions present in any anthropological phenomenon.

3.1. Correlational concepts: intensional aspect

To clarify this further, we shall examine the correlation's formal and logical structure more closely. Correlation is usually understood as a reciprocal relation between two things whose variations are interdependent. More technically, it denotes a relation of co-variation between two variables, where changes in one variable are systematically associated with changes in another. But for our purposes here, it would be more appropriate to consider a correlation as a non-causal co-determination, which is much stronger than a mere co-variation. More formally, by correlation, we intend a binary relation R on a set of pairs (X, Y) that satisfies the following conditions:

- **Mutual influence:** Neither factor is solely responsible for the other; they influence each other in a bidirectional or systemic way.
- **Non-reducibility to causation:** The relationship cannot be reduced to a simple cause-effect structure.
- **Structural dependency:** The factors form a network or system in which their changes are correlated.

For the sake of clarity, let us reformulate a correlation as a set of pairs $\{g(Y), h(X)\}$, where $X= g(Y)$ and $Y= h(X)$. This formulation lucidly illustrates the structural components of correlation as a co-determination. Depending on which of these components becomes the focus of thematic attention—or, put differently, depending on our mode of thematization—a distinct type of research and conceptual apparatus is required. Using the notation $Corr(X,Y) = \{g(Y), h(X)\}$, we can identify three possible modes of consideration, each shaped by the aspect of the correlation emphasized under scrutiny. The thematizing gaze may concentrate on:

i. ***Corr(X,Y) per se***, as a binary relation R, abstracted as an independent category; the category of correlation itself, in other words, is thematized as the subject of inquiry.
ii. ***X*** and ***Y*** as **independent entities**, each abstracted in its isolation, without considering the correlation in which they are embedded.
iii. ***X* as *g(Y)*** and ***Y* as *h(X)***; it is X and Y being determined through their correlation to each other that is thematized.

Now, our question is: what kind of conceptualization is required by a correlative anthropology? To answer this, let us use a general distinction between two types of concepts.[27] If a concept can be predicated of a subject univocally (i.e., without equivocation), then one of two cases must hold:

Essential concept: *the concept is predicated of the subject in and of itself*, regardless of any other thing. This concept can be called "essential" or "quidditative". For example, the concept 'human' is predicated of each individual human in and of itself, not because of its relation to something else. Similarly, the concept 'line' is true of every instance of a line. All essential, generic, specific, or individual concepts are of this kind. A determination that introduces such a concept, or more precisely, a determination that presents a thing through the lens of its essential quidditative concept, is called a "determination according to the essence" or simply an essential determination. Examples include defining geometrical space as a "three-dimensional continuum", or human egoity as "res cogitans".

Relational concept: *The concept is predicated of the subject because of a relation it has to something else*, not in and of itself. This concept is called relational. regardless of whether this relation is essential to the existence of the subject—as in the case of the concepts "accident" and "form", which are predicated of their subjects because of their essential union with matter—or, is accidental and separable—as in the case of the concept "white", which can be predicated of a human, but not essentially, but because of the accidental quality of whiteness—a determination that introduces a relational concept, or more precisely, a determination that presents a thing through the lens of a relational concept, is called a "determination according to a relation", or simply a "relational determination". Examples include definitions of accident, form, whiteness, and soul as "the first perfection of a natural organic body".

To clarify the distinction, drawing a comparison between the Cartesian definition of human subjectivity or egoity as "a thinking thing" (*res cogitans*)[28] and the Aristotelian definition of the soul as "the first perfection of a natural organic body potentially alive"[29] would be particularly beneficial; The human soul can be considered from two perspectives: a) its intrinsic nature as an independent reality deprived of all the relations to external things including its own body, and b) its relation to its effects and actions, especially those actions it performs in the body, which are referred to as "governance" or "control". If we consider the human soul intrinsically and independently of its relations, it is an instance of the essential concept of "substance"; "res cogitans" or "intellect" are terms posited to refer to this aspect of the human

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27 For the distinction I draw particularly on Obūdiyyat (2016: 77-80).

28 For instance, in his *Second Meditation* (Cottingham, 1996: 18).

29 النفس هي الكمال الاول للجسم الطبيعي الآلي الحي بالقوة

This is an Aristotelian definition (not by Aristotle himself) of the soul adopted and modified by Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). See for example: (Ibn Sīnā, 1996: 290)

soul.[30] However, if we disregard this aspect and consider only its relation to something else, it is an instance of a relative concept, not a substance or intellect or the like. Clearly, the 'something else' here includes everything other than the human soul itself, such as its origin, its creator, its effects, and other things. However, in the study of human nature, we are primarily concerned with its effects and actions. In this study, the human soul is considered in relation to its effects and actions, and it is called 'soul' in this context, and it is this aspect that is investigated. Therefore, the term 'soul' has been coined for a relative concept, not an essential and non-relative one. Its denotation is not the soul itself, considered independently of its relations, but the soul in relation to its effects. More precisely, the meaning of soul is nothing other than "something having the relation of origin or governance", where the intended meaning is origin for vital effects and governance of the body. In short, the denotation of soul is nothing other than "the origin of vital effects", "the governor of the body".

Concepts that apply to (i) and (ii) are *essential*, predicated to their subject *in* and *of itself*, regardless of any other thing. Contrary to traditional anthropology that attempts to provide a definition introducing human being from the perspective of an essential conceptual analysis, and thus needs concepts applicable to their extensions as they are in themselves based on their intrinsic essential properties, a correlational anthropology attempts to introduce human being from the perspective of its underlying essential correlation and thus requires concepts applicable to their extensions because of the correlation in which they essentially stand. This kind of concept can be thought as an extended form of *relational* concepts, capable of capturing the correlational structure , in its intension. In other words, correlational anthropology, especially compared to traditional anthropology, is defined by a radical shift of consideration from (i) to (iii); whenever it intends to inquire into *X* it requires to inquire into.

3.2. Correlational Form of Conceptualization

Returning to Sheehan's metaphor, with some modification, the human dimension can still be envisaged as a bipolar field of tension between two opposing yet interdependent poles, whose interactions constitute the whole thematic field of anthropology as an *anthropological space*. In order to conceptualize this anthropological space, we need concepts capable of reflecting its intrinsic bipolarity in themselves; they should be able, so to speak, to function as *conceptual transitions* between two poles. More precisely, considering the form of conceptualization, any correlational concept must be able to function as a conceptual transition between two conceptual frameworks of reference (Figure 3).

[30] because according to the ancient philosophers, the human soul possesses intellectual abstraction, and a substance with such capability is called "intellect".

To prevent any suspicion of arbitrary interpretation, I refer again to the abovementioned remark Husserl wrote in the margins of *Sein und Zeit*, where he implicitly touches on the very idea of transition or transposition (*Übertragung*). Husserl's remark is of course critical and obviously sarcastic in tone. One may even consider it to involve a fundamental misunderstanding about the principal purpose of Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik*. Yet, the misunderstanding does not lie so much in the idea of transition itself as in its *locus*. The transition occurs not between constitutive phenomenology and anthropology, but between anthropology and ontology, indeed both as *phenomenologically reduced*. At a highly abstract level, one may conceive of such a conceptual transition as located in the horizon of a metaphysics of subjectivity, between an egological, subjectivistic anthropology and an anthropomorphic ontology. According to Heidegger's *Fundamentalontologie* or metaphysics of Dasein, this transition will be transposed into a phenomenological sphere within which the anthropo-ontological correlation has already undergone a radical transformation through the filter of phenomenological reduction; The content of the anthropo-ontological correlation can thus be understood in terms of human radical finitude as the condition of possibility for encountering being as intelligible and meaningful, as Sheehan puts it.

In any case, what truly matters here is not the content itself but rather the form of thought's movement or the mechanism of thinking. What kind of concepts are those, in whose intension, capable of capturing "something as correlated", in their form, however, functioning as a conceptual transition?

Suppose one is to study the topological structure of anthropological space as a bipolar field of tension. In that case, one's concepts must be able to register the structural correlations in their intensional content. Therefore, they must exhibit some degree of fluidity; they must be capable of being intensionally rendered as two distinct unipolar concepts and functioning itself as a transition from one to the other.

i. Concomitant to each unipolar perspective one adopts, is a particular mode of thematization.
ii. That particular mode of thematization involves a specific mode of conceptualization, requiring their own types of concepts.
iii. That specific mode of conceptualization together with its own bunch of concepts, entails a conceptual framework of reference.
iv. a correlational concept functions as a conceptual transition between these two conceptual frameworks.

Based on these steps, one can depict the inner structure of such conceptual transitions according to their form as follows:



Figure 3. The structure of correlation concept

The whole field can be conceptualized from each polar viewpoint; each pole can be abstracted as a separate and independent perspective entailing its own specific conceptual coordinate as a framework of reference, according to which anthropological phenomena can be characterized. For instance, from the human pole's viewpoint, one may adopt an entirely subjectivistic framework for conceptualizing anthropological phenomena. The so-called consciousness philosophies (*Bewusstseinsphilosophien*), specifically those philosophical approaches that take an egological conception of self-consciousness as their core concept and departure point, can be mentioned here as an obvious example of such abstraction. On the contrary, from the other pole's viewpoint, let it be "Being"—which according to traditional theological metaphysics may well be equated to "God"—or "world" or "nature", all the anthropological phenomena may be characterized within the parameters of a vast metaphysical or scientific cosmological background framework of reference. Both of these approaches analyze anthropological phenomena from an abstract point of view, from the perspective of a pole abstracted and isolated from that original (*ursprünglich*) bipolar field of tension, whose polar moments are "equiprimordial" (*gleichursprünglich*).

4. Conclusion

In terms of the basic distinction between the *whatness* of an anthropological fundamental determination and the *howness* (modality) of its determining, Matthias Wunsch characterizes Heidegger's anthropological approach as "interior model", meaning that Heidegger seeks to conceptualize human dimension from within human experience and without any reference to an external entity. Wunsch's characterization is certainly true, yet in a very general sense, without grasping the true anthropological substance of Heidegger's phenomenological approach to human phenomena.

Phenomenology, from the broadest perspective, focuses on the direct examination and description of phenomena as they are given, without presuppositions or theoretical interpretations. It demands to return "to the things themselves" (*zu den Sachen selbst*), according to Husserl, or "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself", according to Heidegger (GA 2: 46). Wunsch understands Heidegger's phenomenological approach within this general framework. However, what he overlooks is that phenomenology, at its core, is a "correlation research", as Sheehan puts it; in Husserl's case, it seeks to thematize "the universal a priori of correlation" underlying phenomena. In this article, I have attempted to demonstrate that the same holds true for Heidegger, and to situate his phenomenological approach to the realm of human phenomena within the context of his own onto-anthropological correlationism; From the hermeneutics of facticity (GA 63), to the fundamental ontology (GA 2)—centering around a throughgoing existential analysis of Dasein's ontological constitutions—and metaphysics of Dasein (GA 3)—based on laying the foundations of metaphysics in anthropology—the main phases of Heidegger's intellectual development can be depicted as a one continuous thematic trajectory: a continuing attempt to surmount the metaphysics of subjectivity and its essential concomitant anthropologism and anthropocentrism, by repeatedly thematizing, perhaps in its various facets and from different perspectives though, the onto-anthropological correlation between *Sein* (being) and *Da-sein* (being-there). It is in the light of this fundamental correlation that Heidegger's anthropological approach is to be characterized.

More specifically, when phenomenologically examining the human dimension—or what I have termed *anthropological space*—as a bipolar field of tension from within, one inevitably encounters its intrinsic correlationality. This is due to its structural homomorphism with the correlational onto-anthropological space in its topological configuration. Therefore, I suggested that it is more appropriate to refer to Heidegger's anthropological approach as a "*correlation model*" instead of "*interior model*". Correlational anthropology can be clearly distinguished from the more traditional *"addition model"*, as well as from the other anthropological models identified by Wunsch—the *transformation* and *privation* models. This distinction, however, lies not only in its examination of human phenomena from within,

without recourse to comparisons with external entities, but also in its thematization of the entirety of the human dimension—or anthropological space—through the lens of its intrinsic *onto-anthropological correlation*. Yet, in this article, I have limited myself to presenting a general portrayal of what a correlational anthropology might entail, particularly in its formal structure.

In essence, Correlational anthropology takes the entirety of anthropological space as its core concept and departure point, seeking to thematize the bipolar field of tension as an integral whole, without any abstraction. Therefore, it necessitates a new mode of conceptualization and a different conceptual apparatus—one that employs *correlational concepts* capable of grasping and capturing in their intension the intrinsic polar interactions inherent in any anthropological phenomenon; according to their form of conceptualization, however, they should be able to function as *conceptual transitions* between the two conceptual frameworks of reference. Correlational concepts, therefore, must:

- *Intentionally,* reflect a correlation, a bipolar interaction.
- *Formally,* function as conceptual transitions between two polar conceptual frameworks.

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