

**World-Formation and Dasein.
Heidegger's Understanding of the World
in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*
and His Reference to Heraclitus, Aristotle and Schelling**

**Formación de mundo y Dasein.
La comprensión del mundo heideggeriana
en *Los conceptos fundamentales de la metafísica*
y en sus referencias a Heráclito, Aristóteles y Schelling**

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Abstract: The subject of this paper is Heidegger's understanding of world and world-formation [*Weltbildung*] in his lecture *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (GA 29/30) and his references to the idealistic philosophy of Schelling, the ancient thought of Aristotle and Heraclitus. I will put forward the following thesis: World is prevailing [*Walten*] and, as this prevailing, it is the being of beings as such as a whole in the projection of world that lets it prevail. In this paper, I will clarify how the world prevails, how *Dasein* forms the world, and the significance of *physis*, *logos* and *as-structure* [*als-Struktur*] in this context. I will also show that Heidegger's concept of world-formation can be thought together with his concepts of *being-in-the-world* and *worldhood*. Finally, I will discuss some of the difficulties in Heidegger's understanding of the world and propose some solutions.

Key-words: world, world-formation, ontological difference, *physis*, Schelling

Resumen: El tema de este trabajo es la comprensión que Heidegger tiene del mundo y de la formación de mundo [*Weltbildung*] en su curso *Los Conceptos Fundamentales de la Metafísica* (GA 29/30) y en sus sus referencias a la filosofía idealista de Schelling, así como al pensamiento antiguo de Aristóteles y Heráclito. Plantearé la siguiente tesis: el mundo es lo que prevalece y, como tal, es el ser del ente en su totalidad en la proyección de mundo que deja prevalecer. En este trabajo, aclararé cómo prevalece el mundo, cómo el *Dasein* forma mundo y el significado de *physis*, *logos* y la estructura del “en cuanto”. También mostraré que el concepto heideggeriano de formación de mundo puede pensarse junto con los conceptos de *estar-en-el-mundo* y *mundidad*. Por último, discutiré algunas de las dificultades de la comprensión heideggeriana del mundo y propondré algunas soluciones.

Palabras clave: mundo, formación de mundo, diferencia ontológica, *physis*, Schelling

1. Introduction

In his lecture *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik – Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit* (GA 29/30) from the winter semester 1929/30¹, Heidegger asks, out of the fundamental attunement [*Grundstimmung*] of boredom, for the concept of world to really «unfold a metaphysical question» (GA 29/30, p. 273; trans. p. 185). Heidegger asks out of the fundamental attunement of deep boredom [*tiefe Langeweile*] because, as in the case of anxiety, this fundamental attunement opens up an original perspective on human *Dasein* and makes *Dasein* aware of its fundamental situation in the world.² Even more: the fundamental attunement of boredom reveals beings as such as a whole [*Seiende im Ganzen*] or the world «as a whole» (GA 29/30, p. 251; trans. p. 169). In this context, the reader of *Die Grundbegriffe* cannot miss a point cleverly made by Heidegger: Individual *Dasein* is seized by the world «as a whole» precisely because it is not seized by it, but left empty. This event of emptiness culminates in a triple negativity: the non-self, the void world and the lack of reference. In other words, the fundamental attunements of boredom and fear make it impossible for *Dasein* to relate to beings in the inner world: they make it comparatively invalid, as in the case of boredom, or reduce the reference, as in the case of fear. The world «as a whole» only becomes abundantly clear when it appears at a distance that evokes the metaphysical attitude of astonishment or fright (cf. GA 29/30, p. 531). Only when *Dasein*, qua boredom (or fear), is removed from all being-fallen [*Verfallensein*] and being absorbed by the world, has denied itself all temptations of the «they» [*das Man*] and has almost slipped away from the world «as a whole», only *then* does the world and one's own *Dasein* return with a new intensity. How the world prevails (2.), how *Dasein* forms the world (3. and 4.), and to what extent Heidegger's understanding of the world in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* can be reconciled with his earlier thinking of being-in-the-world [*In-der-Welt-sein*] and worldhood [*Weltlichkeit*] (5.) will be discussed in the following sections. In section 4, the focus is on the extent to which Heidegger refers to Schelling's philosophy and how such a reference can be justified in terms of the work itself.

¹ Just like *Sein und Zeit*, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* have remained torso. Only the concept of «world» was elaborated by Heidegger, but not the concepts of finitude [*Endlichkeit*] and solitude [*Einsamkeit*]. Nor were the concepts of finitude and solitude elaborated further by Heidegger in his subsequent works, since, as is well known, his ontological approach changed fundamentally. It should be noted at this point that Heidegger originally planned his lecture under the title *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics – World – Finitude – Isolation*. However, in his lecture manuscript, he replaced the word «isolation» [*Vereinzelung*] with «solitude» [*Einsamkeit*] (GA 29/30, editor's epilogue, p. 537). Apart from studies of the attunement of boredom, there are relatively few studies that also focus on the systematic main part (GA 29/30, Second Part, Chapter 6) of the Lecture Notes. Exceptions include Axel Beelmann (1994, pp. 1-272); Elizabeth Cykowski (2015, pp. 1-492); Robert J.A. van Dijk (1991, pp. 89-109); Joseph P. Fell (1994, pp. 91-109); Dimitri Ginev (2018, pp. 36-80); Mario Ionut Marosan (2021, pp. 78-95); Michael Lewis, (2017, pp. 47-106); Diego Parente (2008, pp. 75-93); Katherine Withy (2013, pp. 161-178); Matthias Wunsch (2010, pp. 543-560); even if these then rarely refer to GA 29/30, Part Two, Chapter 6 and more often focus on the relationship animal-world as it is negotiated in Part Two, Chapter 3-5.

² It should be noted that Heidegger's term «being-in-the-world» does not appear anywhere in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, since the lecture concentrates primarily on the fundamental attunement of boredom and the formation of the world [*Weltbildung*]. Nevertheless, it seems possible to transfer this term to the lecture given two years after *Sein und Zeit*, as I would like to make clear in the last part of this article.

2. World as the manifestness of beings as such as a whole

The core thesis of Heidegger's understanding of the world in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* is, in my opinion, the following: *World is prevailing and, as this prevailing, it is the being of beings as such as a whole in the projection of the world that lets it prevail* [*Welt ist Walten und als dieses Walten ist es das Sein des Seiendem im Ganzen qua waltenlassenden Weltentwurf*]. What is meant by this, to what extent the concept of world-formation [*Weltbildung*] occupies a central position here, and to what extent Heidegger refers to Schelling's philosophy, will be precisely elaborated in the following pages. I would like to begin with Heidegger's understanding of the world «as the manifestness of beings as such as a whole» (GA 29/30, pp. 409-410, transl. p. 282).

Heidegger begins by strongly rejecting the «natural concept of world» (GA 29/30, pp. 409-410; transl. p. 282).³ He does not understand the world simply as «the entirety of beings, everything that there is, taken together [...] in the factual undifferentiatedness of everydayness» (GA 29/30, p. 405; transl. p. 279). And for him, the world does not mean merely «something present at hand» (GA 29/30, p. 423; transl. p. 292). For him, the world is the «*manifestness of beings as such as a whole*» (GA 29/30, p. 412; transl. p. 284). Manifestness [*Offenbarkeit*] is what makes the accessibility of beings possible in the first place. It is pre-logical and pre-predicative. In other words, for Heidegger, *Dasein* is already open to beings before all logical predication. But what does «as a whole» mean? For Heidegger, it does not mean «the whole of beings in the sense of the totality of everything in general that in itself is» (GA 29/30, pp. 412-413; transl. pp. 284-285), but «it means the form of those beings that are manifest to us as such.» (GA 29/30, p. 413; transl. p. 285) Heidegger outlines this «as a whole» a few pages later when he writes:

[T]he pre-logical manifestness of beings has the character of «as a whole». In every assertion, whether we know it or not, and in each case in different and changing ways, we speak out of the whole and into it. Above all, this «as a whole» does not only concern those beings we have before us in being occupied with them, for instance; rather all those beings that are accessible in each case, ourselves included, are embraced by this whole. We ourselves are comprehensively included in this «as a whole», not in the sense of some component belonging to it that also happens to be there, but in different ways in each case and in possibilities belonging to the essence of *Dasein* itself, be it in the form of immersing ourselves in beings, or be it in the form of directly facing them, going along with them, being rebuffed by them, being left empty, being held in limbo, being fulfilled or being sustained by them. These are ways in which this 'as a whole' prevails around and through us, ways that lie before any taking up of positions and before all standpoints, ways that are independent of subjective reflection or psychological experience. [...] this «as a whole», the world, admits precisely the manifestness of manifold beings in the various contexts of their being--other human beings, animals, plants, material things, artworks, i.e., everything we are capable of identifying as beings. [...] The formally so-called manifold of beings requires quite specific conditions in order to become manifest as such. It does not at all merely require the possibility of being able to distinguish the various specific ways of being, as though these were simply lined up alongside one another in a vacuum. The interweaving of the distinctions themselves, and the way in which this interweaving oppresses and sustains us, is, as this prevailing, the primordial lawfulness out of which we first comprehend the specific constitution of being pertaining to those beings standing before us or even those beings that have been made the object of scientific theory. (GA 29/30, pp. 513-514; transl. pp. 353-354)

³ As Heidegger had previously argued in GA 27, pp. 239-309; GA 9, pp. 155-156; GA 24, pp. 421-422; GA 64, p. 26 and also later, for example, in GA 5, pp. 30-31 and p. 207.

«As a whole» thus means: the world. The world, which in its prevailing conditions allows the manifestation of the diversity of beings in different contexts. The world's prevailing is its primordial being, «is more originary than all those beings that press themselves upon us.» (GA 29/30, p. 510; transl. p. 351) The «as a whole» of the world can indeed vary in its breadth, its transparency and its richness of content, and this also happens in the ordinariness of *Dasein*, but all of this only knows itself to be founded by the prevailing of the world itself. But why does Heidegger speak of the «prevailing» [*Walten*] of the world?

«Prevailing» by Heidegger (repeatedly also rendered as «worlding» [*Welten*], «swinging» [*Schwingen*] and «ruling» [*Herrschend*]) is used by him both as a noun, in the substantivised infinitive form, and as a verb. In addition, Heidegger sometimes combines it with prefixes, for example, he sometimes speaks of «umwalten» [prevails around], «durchwalten» [prevails through], «vorwalten» [prevails ahead] etc. He also occasionally uses the active participle form, «das Waltende», «das was waltet» [the prevailing, that which prevails]. At the beginning of his lecture, in GA 29/30 paragraphs 8 and 9, Heidegger explicates the meaning of Aristotelian *physis* (φύσις), deliberately avoiding the term «nature» – into which *physis* is commonly translated – but offering instead the highly unorthodox and original translation of *physis* as «prevailing». *Physis* in this Heideggerian translation does not simply mean a set of things that exist in the world, but means the force that allows things to be things and allows the world to be a world (cf. GA 38 A, pp. 105-106). In this context, a double meaning is to be ascribed to «prevailing»: On the one hand, «that which prevails in its prevailing» (GA 29/30, p. 46; transl. p. 30) and, on the other, «prevailing as such as the essence and inner law of nature» (GA 29/30, p. 47; transl. p. 31). This double meaning of prevailing forms the core of all later uses of the term by Heidegger (cf. Knowles, 2013, pp. 256-276 and Knowles, 2021, pp. 606-610).

Heidegger connects the *first* meaning with the traditional conception of *physis* as nature. This prevailing denotes the elementary entities that are connected with nature in the narrower sense, such as «the vault of the heavens, the stars, the ocean, the earth» (GA 29/30, p. 46; transl. p. 30). It is precisely this productive force of nature, which sees itself embodied in the earth, the heavens and other natural entities, and «that which of itself is always already at hand, continually forming and passing away of its own accord» (GA 29/30, p. 46; transl. pp. 30-31), that is distinguished from the objects that have come into being through human skill or craft [τέχνη] and come into being and pass away through human intervention. Heidegger argues for *physis* to be understood in this sense as a «regional concept» (GA 29/30, p. 46; transl. p. 30) denoting the realm of self-motion that occurs without human intervention. Thus it is said:

Φύσις now means that which of itself is always already at hand, continually forming and passing away of its own accord, as distinct from that which is of human making, that which springs from τέχνη, from skill, invention, and production. Φύσις, that which prevails, in this distinct and yet narrower meaning now designates a distinctive region of beings, certain beings among others. (GA 29/30, p. 46, transl. pp. 30-31)

The *second* meaning refers no longer to a specific region or area, but to the animating force that moves matter in a completely Aristotelian sense of movement. *Physis*, understood in this way, does not mean «that which prevails itself, but its prevailing as such, the essence, the inner law of a matter.» (GA 29/30, p. 47; transl. p. 31) Heidegger characterises this «prevailing» a few pages earlier, as

this whole prevailing that prevails through man himself, a prevailing that he does not have power over, but which precisely prevails through and around him-him, man, who has always already spoken out about this. Whatever he understands – however enigmatic and obscure it may be to him in its details – he understands it; it nears him, sustains and overwhelms him as that which is: φύσις, that which prevails, beings, beings as a whole. I emphasize once more that φύσις as beings as a whole is not meant in the modern, late sense of nature, as the conceptual counterpart to history for instance. Rather it is intended more originally than both of these concepts, in an originary meaning which, prior to nature and history, encompasses both, and even in a certain way includes divine beings. (GA 29/30, p. 39; transl. p. 26)

Heidegger goes beyond Aristotle in his characterisation of this prevailing and finds his guarantor in Heraclitus. In doing so, he relies, among other things, on the following fragments (quoted according to the order in which they appear in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*):

Fragment (DK 22 B 123)⁴, which contains the basic statement of bathphysical philosophy: φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ. Heidegger translates this as follows: «The prevailing of things has in itself a striving to conceal itself» (GA 29/30, p. 41; transl. p. 27) Furthermore, Fragment (DK 22 B 112) states: τὸ φρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίοντας. Heidegger translates this as follows: «The highest that man has in his power is to meditate (upon the whole), and wisdom (lucidity) is to say and to do what is unconcealed as unconcealed, in accordance with the prevailing of things, listening out for them.» (GA 29/30, p. 42; transl. p. 28) Also fragment (DK 22 B 54): ἀρμονίη ἀφανῆς φανερῆς κρείττον. Heidegger translates this as follows: «Higher and more powerful than the harmony lying open to the day is the harmony which does not show itself (is concealed).» (GA 29/30, p. 44; transl. p. 29) Last fragment (DK 22 B 30): κόσμον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζων, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα. Heidegger says: «This kosmos [...] is always the same throughout everything, and neither a god nor any human being created it, rather this φύσις always was, always is, and always will be an ever-flaming fire, flaring up according to measure and extinguishing according to measure.» (GA 29/30, p. 47; transl. p. 31)⁵

What Heidegger wants to make clear with his reference to Heraclitus is that physis is essentially self-concealing and that it takes the logos for physis to be unconcealed. Logos is characterised in Heidegger's lecture notes as «taking the prevailing of beings as a whole out of concealment» (GA 29/30, p. 39; transl. p. 26) and then specified in more detail as «the saying of what is unconcealed» (GA 29/30, p. 41; transl. p. 27). The logos will be the focus of the next section. However, Heidegger leaves this in the dark as to whether physis is being itself, even though there is much to be said for this, as the passages quoted here have shown. A remark by Richard Rorty seems to me to be helpful here, when he deals with Heidegger's understanding of being:

So is Being the leaf, the blossom, the bole, or what? I think the best answer is that it is what elementary words of Being refer to. But since such words of Being – words like physis or subiectum or will to power – are just abbreviations for whole vocabularies, whole chains of interlocked metaphors, it is better to say that Being is what vocabularies are about. [...]

⁴ All fragments quoted here by Heidegger are from Hermann Diels/Walter Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Greek and German*, I-III, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 1922, pp. 83-100.

⁵ In addition, Heidegger refers at one point to another fragment of Heraclitus, which, however, plays no role in this context (cf. GA 29/30, pp. 40-41).

Being is what final vocabularies are about. A final vocabulary is one which we cannot help using, for when we reach it our spade is turned. We cannot undercut it because we have no metavocabulary in which to phrase criticisms of it. Nor can we compare it with what it is about, test it for «adequacy» – for there is no nonlinguisitic access to Being. To put the point in slightly more Heideggerian language: all we know of Being is that it is what understandings of Being are understandings of. But that is also all we need to know. We do not need to ask which understandings of Being are better understandings. (Rorty, 1992, p. 216)

This, like Rorty's article in general, seems to me to be an important indication at this point that for Heidegger in the summer semester of 1929/30, «being» can be said in several ways – whether as «*physis*», as «*being of beings*» or even as «*world*» itself – and that it is precisely in this pronouncement that it becomes apparent that we are reaching the limits of our vocabulary. In sum: the assumption *that* something is, is usually associated with an entity. Heidegger's talk of the «*prevailing of world*» is cleverly chosen here, since with such an understanding of the world he distinguishes himself as strongly as possible from an understanding of the world in a sense of reification. The world is not something present at hand, but it exists and prevails. And: «*world only is what it is in [...] formation.*» (GA 29/30, p. 413; transl. p. 285) In the next sections, it will emerge that the prevailing of world makes the difference between being and beings appear. It *calls* the veiled essence of difference. The question should now be what conditions are required on the part of *Dasein* so that the diversity of beings can reveal itself, so that the world can show and manifest itself and the extent to which Heidegger draws on Schelling's philosophy to support it. At this point, Heidegger's term «*world-formation*» [*Weltbildung*] appears for the first time and, in close proximity to it, *logos*.

3. World-formation and logos

Heidegger writes: «*world belongs to world-formation [...] world, forms itself, and world only is what it is in such formation.*» (GA 29/30, p. 413; transl. p. 285) The human being qua being human is world-forming. More precisely: *Dasein* «*in man is world-forming.*» (GA 29/30, p. 414; transl. p. 285) World-formation is understood in a threefold sense: «*The Dasein in man forms world: [1.] it brings it forth; [2.] it gives an image or view of the world, it sets it forth; [3.] it constitutes the World, contains and embraces it.*» (GA 29/30, p. 414; transl. p. 285) Heidegger's whole concentration, in the question of understanding the world in particular of the world-formation, is initially directed towards the statement [*Aussage*] and the judgement [*Urteil*], more precisely the *logos*, $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\varsigma$ – «*the doctrine of discourse in general*» (GA 29/30, p. 438; transl. p. 302). In his lecture notes Heidegger understands the *logos* as «*an ability, i.e., it intrinsically entails having a relating toward beings as such at one's disposal.*» (GA 29/30, pp. 438-489, transl. p. 337) In addition, he presents it as «*as taking the prevailing of beings as a whole out of concealment*» (GA 29/30, pp. 39-40; transl. pp. 40-41). In the *logos*, the revealing discourse, that which initially and mostly does not show itself is highlighted and made explicit. The question arises as to the inner connection between $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\varsigma$ and the world. Heidegger first directs his attention to the structure of general assertions. He recognises that the «*as*» represents the *central* structural moment. In this context, he also speaks of the «*as-structure*» of statements. For Heidegger, the «*as-structure*» is the essential phenomenon of *logos* and thus of logic in general. It makes it possible to grasp something *as* something. Epistemologically, the «*as-structure*» belongs to the

context of discovery in which something appears «as» something and is also explicitly understood in this «as-character». As will be seen in the following sections, the «as» is the designation for the structural moment of that originally intervening «in-between» that becomes visible between beings and being. It is precisely this «as» that is also essentially contained in the linguistic form of expression «world is manifestness of beings *as such as a whole*». The possibility of meaning [*Bedeutung*], giving something to be understood [*Zuverstehengeben*] and of concealment [*Verbergung*] can be traced back to it, as well as the condition of the possibility of truth and falsity in the statement. *Prima facie*, there seems to be something to be said for understanding the logos as the *condition* of world-formation. According to Heidegger, however, this is not the case.

Instead of following the metaphysical tradition up to Hegel and understanding the logos, like logic in general, as a suitable dimension from which «the problem of being», in particular the «world as the manifestness of beings as such as a whole», is to be developed, Heidegger sees the potential for destruction here, in the sense that world-formation still precedes logic and that this is, so to speak, only placed second. It becomes his central concern to not only trace the question of the understanding of the world, as the basic problem of metaphysics, back to logic and the logos, but to go beyond this. In the context of the problem of the world, Heidegger wants to break the connection between metaphysics and logic that has become self-evident (cf. GA 29/30, p. 421). In this small Copernican turn, it is not the logos that becomes the basis of world-formation, but world-formation that becomes the cause of the logos (cf. GA 29/30, p. 486). Thus, in Heidegger's view, the logos offers no viable ground for the unfolding of the understanding of the world. The primacy of logic in relation to the essence of metaphysics thus becomes questionable altogether. Heidegger wants to go beyond the logos. He propagates a pre-logical being open to beings as such as a whole [*vorlogisches Offensein für das Seiende im Ganzen*], which is what founds and gives rise to the logos in the first place (cf. GA 29/30, p. 485). It is true that the logos opens up to *Dasein* «*what-being, being such and such, that-being, and being-true*» (GA 29/30, p. 506; transl. p. 348), but this is only because *Dasein* is already being open towards being before all logical predication: «all $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\circ$ can only point out, i.e., take apart and examine, whatever is *already pre- logically manifest*» (GA 29/30, p. 502; transl. p. 346), according to Heidegger.

Dasein relates to this pre-logical being open for beings in its entirety in *three* respects:

- 1) *Dasein* is able to hold the binding character of things towards oneself. [*Das Dasein vermag sich das Seiende in einer Verbindlichkeit entgegenzuhalten.*]
- 2) *Dasein* is able to complement beings in its worldly character. [*Das Dasein vermag es das Seiende auf seine Welhaftigkeit hin zu ergänzen.*]
- 3) *Dasein* is able to unveil the being of beings. [*Das Dasein vermag das Sein des Seienden zu enthüllen.*]

Heidegger calls this threefold possibility the «fundamental occurrence in *Dasein*» (GA 29/30, p. 507; p. 349), in which world-formation takes place. The event of world-formation is what gives rise to the «as» and the logos in the first place. The «as» marks the beginning of the articulation of the understanding of being (being able to see and understand

something *as* something) in individual determinations, which can then become an understanding of the world. The relationship between the individual (*Dasein*) and the whole (world) becomes comprehensible. For Heidegger, every human being is world-forming in the essence of his or her *Dasein* (cf. GA 29/30, p. 512). World-building thus becomes a proprium of being human. The three structural moments of the fundamental occurrence of world-formation can be explained in detail in this way:

1) *Dasein* is able to hold beings against itself in a binding manner. The behaviour of *Dasein* is always already imbued with commitment when it relates to beings. Without Heidegger referring to his own term of *being-in-the-world*, this first structural moment of the fundamental occurrence of world formation also shows that *Dasein* qua *Da-sein* always already relates and must relate to beings. Whether it binds itself to the respective beings or does not want to bind itself, *Dasein* is always oriented towards the beings and yet can never say «what it is about beings that binds us, or what the possibility of such binding is grounded in our part.» (GA 29/30, p. 525; transl. p. 361) All beings related to, all behaviour towards beings is dominated by bindingness. Here, Heidegger borrows from his colleague Max Scheler and at one point chooses the Schelerian term of «world-openness» (cf. Scheler, 1991, p. 38): after holding oneself in opposition to a binding thing, beings must already be revealed as beings in advance. This genuine «being open», characterised by Heidegger as «world-openness of man» (GA 29/30, p. 498; transl. p. 343), characterises the «fundamental comportment» and «freedom» of *Dasein* (cf. GA 29/30, p. 498; transl. p. 343).

2) *Dasein* is able to complement what exists in terms of its worldliness. By means of the structural moment of completion, which goes hand in hand with the binding holding of oneself in opposition to binding beings, Heidegger designates the circumstance that, *before* all predication through the logos, *Dasein* has already completed beings into a whole. A concise view of the phenomenon of completion can be gained if it is noted that for Heidegger, the central achievement of completion in the craft sense consists in the fact that the whole is already seen in its context in advance and that this is not only formed in the procedure, in the mere addition of missing pieces. According to Heidegger, all behaviour of *Dasein* is «already prevails throughout our comportment, to the extent that we comport ourselves towards beings» (GA 29/30, p. 525; transl. p. 361).

3) *Dasein* is able to unveil the being of beings. According to Heidegger, the being of beings must already be revealed «in» and «through» complementing (cf. GA 29/30, p. 506). From the unveiling of the being of beings derives the ontological difference, for Heidegger the «central» essential moment of the world, «from which the problem of world in general can be comprehended.» (GA 29/30, pp. 525-526; transl. p. 358) The early Heidegger – not only in this work – is very reticent when it comes to *how* he understands the being of beings itself and *how* it can be made tangible. We will have to come back to this circumstance in the later sections. Heidegger refers to the threefold event as the «fundamental occurrence of world-formation», but it does not exhaust the concept of world-formation. It does not exhaust the concept of world-formation because the three structural moments must first come together in a unity, in a «unitary character» (GA 29/30, p. 526; transl. p. 362). This happens through an original structure, the unity-creating projection [*Entwurf*]. The extent to which the threefold event of world-formation is founded on the projection and the three structural moments are «originarily interwoven» (GA 29/30, p. 530; transl. p. 365) in it will be the subject of the next section.

4. World-formation, projection and the reference to Schelling

The archetypal structure and unity of the threefold fundamental occurrence in *Dasein* is projection. Heidegger understands the projection as an «intrinsic possibility» (GA 29/30, p. 526; transl. p. 362) of *Dasein* itself. Consequently, he also speaks of the «projective character» (GA 29/30, p. 526; transl. p. 362) by which *Dasein* knows itself to be determined. For Heidegger, projection is «namely that occurrence which fundamentally makes possible all familiar projection in our everyday comportment» (GA 29/30, p. 526; transl. p. 362). The projection as the original structure of the threefold fundamental occurrence in *Dasein* thus becomes the basic structure of the formation of the world. In projection, «*there occurs the letting-prevail of the being of beings in the whole of their possible binding character in each case. In projection world prevails.*» (GA 29/30, p. 530; transl. p. 365) Or according to the formulated core thesis: *World is prevailing and, as this prevailing, it is the being of beings as such as a whole in the projection of world that lets it prevail.* An even deeper insight into the correlation between world, world-formation and projection can be gained if the focus is once again directed towards the question of ontological difference:

That being and beings can be distinguished and become manifest in their distinguishability, this is made possible by the projection as the primal structure of the threefold divided fundamental occurrence in *Dasein*. To put it more precisely: The projection opens itself to the possibility of the difference between being and beings, the ontological difference. In the active process of projection, the projecting, the enabling of the difference between being and beings is revealed. The following applies: «*The projection unveils the being of beings.*» (GA 29/30, p. 529; transl. p. 364) The projection makes the ontological difference «happen» (cf. GA 29/30, p. 524). How can this be further understood? What does Heidegger mean when he says that the projection is the «irruption» into the «between» of the difference between being and beings? And is there something on which even the ontological difference still rests? Heidegger is very cautious at this central point in his lecture. A few thoughts are cautiously sketched out before the lecture comes to an end. The reader is all the more challenged in his or her own thinking. In my opinion, the following reading suggests itself at this point:

The projection makes the difference between being and beings possible – the ontological difference. It allows it to «happen» (cf. GA 29/30, p. 518). This can be understood in this way: The ontological difference already exists. We are always already in it qua our existence as *Dasein*.⁶ The ontological difference «happens to us as the fundamental occurrence of our existence» (cf. GA 29/30, p. 519) and it is «in the metaphysical sense, therefore, [...] the commencement of *Dasein* itself.» (GA 29/30, p. 519; transl. p. 357) Thus ontological difference is the fundamental disposition of *Dasein*. The distinguishing feature of *Dasein* lies precisely in the fact «that in understanding being it comports itself towards beings, then that potential for distinguishing in which the ontological difference becomes factual must have sunk the roots of its own possibility in the ground of the essence of *Dasein*.» (GA 9, p. 134; transl. p. 106) However, it is only the projection that evokes and opens up an «*occurrence of this distinguishing*» (GA 29/30, p. 524; transl. p. 361) between being and beings and makes it possible to move «*within the distinction as it occurs.*» (GA 29/30, p. 519; transl. p. 357) In short, it is the projection that unveils the ontological difference, carries it out and allows it to

⁶ cf. «We stand in the distinction between beings and being. Such differentiation sustains the relationship to Being and supports relations with beings.» (*Nietzsche II*, GA 6.2, p. 207; transl. p. 153).

become practical. In this way, the projection can also be understood as the «irruption into the distinction between being and beings, or more precisely as the erupting of this ‘between’» (GA 29/30, p. 530; transl. p. 365) [*als Einbruch in den Unterschied von Sein und Seiendem, genauer als Aufbrechen dieses Zwischen*]. The Projection is «the irruption into this ‘between’ of the distinction. It first makes possible the terms that are distinguished in their distinguishability.» (GA 29/30, p. 529; transl. p. 364) On a higher level of explication, this «between» is then described by the «as»: being can reveal itself as something.

One might easily read this passage as meaning that the projection itself creates the ontological difference. Finally, one can rightly ask how different things can be made possible in their distinctness in the first place, don’t they have to be undifferentiated first? But how can Heidegger then already speak of the «distinguished» [*Unterschiedenen*]? On close reading, however – and this holds up coherently – it crystallises that the distinguished – being and beings – must always already exist for Heidegger, but that it is only the projection that «tracks down» this difference and allows it to be «unveiled». So it is logical to say: «The projection unveils the being of beings.» (GA 29/30, p. 529; transl. p. 364) This can also be understood in such a way that only by the irruption of the projection into the «between» of the ontological difference can the question of being become explicit in the immanence of beings as such as a whole (cf. Malpas, 2011, pp. 119-120). Only *then* can the question of the meaning of being be asked and the being of beings be revealed. And it is precisely *this* being of beings that is the prevailing of the world as such as whole, as will be seen. All in all, this reading, which I have proposed, results in the following:

The ontological difference already exists. However, it is only the projection that unveils and brings being and beings to life in their distinctness and turns them into an active event in which *Dasein* itself moves. Thus, projecting is a specific possibility of unconcealing [*Entbergen*] in which the difference between being and beings opens up (cf. GA 29/30, p. 529). The projection reveals the being of beings by letting the ontological difference happen. Through the unveiling of the being of beings, beings can stand out from being and be present. In my opinion, this very passage marks an important turning point in Heidegger’s philosophical thought, which will then lead to the later turn [*Kehre*]: The projection not only reveals the being of beings, by letting the ontological difference happen, but what sees itself essentially realised here is, moreover, the projection of being. The projection projects the «original being», the being «of a properly primordial kind» (GA 29/30, p. 531; transl. p. 365) – which still precedes the ontological difference – itself into the being of beings.

Certainly, the question can be asked at this point whether Heidegger is already anticipating his later thinking on beyng [*Seyn*] here. In the course of his turn [*Kehre*], Heidegger devotes himself more to the openness of being itself than, as in *Sein und Zeit*, to the openness of *Dasein* in the face of the openness of being (cf. GA 15, p. 345). In his writings *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)* (1938), *Besinnung* (1938/39) and his seminars, held together with Eugen Fink, on Heraclitus (1966/67), as is well known, man is not declared the creator of being, but serves being, now called beyng by Heidegger, merely as a kind of medium. Being, unthought of on the pathways of traditional metaphysics, is emphasised by Heidegger through the spelling «beyng». The notation is oriented on an older German orthography, oriented among others on Schelling. It emphasises beyng in the sole sense of the word over being of beings. Beyng thereby proves to be that which is passed over, that which is denied, but which «possesses for itself uniqueness and complete strangeness» (GA 65, p. 238; transl. p.

188). Here, the complementary reciprocity of presence and absence is demonstrated. For beyng is not to be gained outside of its refusal [*Verweigerung*] and its self-withdrawing [*Sich-Entziehen*]. It is «the first and highest gift of beyng, indeed its primordially essential occurrence itself» (GA 65, p. 241; transl. 190). This is connected with the expectation that beyng will suddenly arise, shows itself. It is therefore understood as «the event» [*das Ereignis*]. This is connected with the fact that event is understood in a consistently temporal way. It «clears the self-concealing» (GA 65, p. 247; transl. 195). In the sense of *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, beyng itself still precedes the ontological difference. Thus Heidegger writes: «The differentiation between being and beings [...] can originate only in the essential occurrence of beyng, if on the other hand beings as such are also grounded by being.» (GA 65, p. 465; transl. p. 366) Ultimately, *three* determinations are given to beyng in *Beiträge zur Philosophie*: the abrupt manifestation of the hidden, the *physis*, it is then determined by Heidegger as «the differentiation» (GA 65, p. 465; transl. p. 366.) between being and beings, and it is historical in the sense that it occurs [*west*], i.e. it is either absent or present. The extent to which Heidegger anticipates his later thinking on being at this point remains to be clarified; what is certain is that structural features are certainly present in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* that make an identification of being with the later beyng in need of discussion. In view of this, Heidegger's *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* seem all the more like a work of transition to the later turn, which are no longer to be read only in the light of *Sein und Zeit*. But back to the projection that projects the «original being» towards the being of beings.

What is decisive now is that the «original being» and the being of beings are not different, but the same. «Original being» only shows itself by letting the ontological difference happen, and this is precisely what happens in the projection. «Original being», understood as movement, as process, gives birth to concrete beings. It makes it possible for beings to be. Bringing forth and behaving towards beings require the process of projection in *Dasein*, as a «medium». In a sense, two processes can be located here:

1) The «original being» shows itself as the being of beings in the projection. The projection projects the «original being» into the being of beings, in which it reveals it (cf. GA 29/30, pp. 529-530). The space of possibility designed by the projection of being then forms the world. The projection of being is the projecting of world, but the projecting of world is world-formation. In other words: The projection of the world in the fundamental occurrence of *Dasein* always a priori releases everything that exists, beings, that is to be able to encounter *Dasein* in the inner world. And indeed freely, in terms of the categorial form of what is stated in the «is»-saying by the logos – something is so and so, something as something, etc. – by the projection of world itself.

2) The projection not only projects the «original being» into a being of beings, but in the projection *Dasein* itself also projects itself into a being-there, into a *Da-sein*, this already seems familiar from the concept of world-disclosedness [*Welterschlossenheit*], which Heidegger propounded in *Sein und Zeit*. *Dasein*, determined by its character of projection, is lifted into the possible qua projection, more precisely, through the structural moment of holding oneself against the binding character of things. In this «space of possibilities», *Dasein* can take hold of possibilities, realise [*verwirklichen*] them and complement them, thereby essentially being there. The projection is thus essentially enabling and prefigures realisation [*Verwirklichung*]. With reference to Schelling, Heidegger declared the projection to be «the look into the light of a possible

making-possible» [*Lichtblick ins Mögliche-Ermöglichende*] (GA 29/30, pp. 529-530; transl. p. 364), the «glimpse of light». Exactly it says at this point:

The projection unveils the being of beings. For this reason it is, as we may say in borrowing a word from Schelling, 1 the look into the light of a possible making-possible [*Lichtblick ins Mögliche-Ermöglichende*] in general. The look into the light tears darkness as such along with it, gives the possibility of that dawning of the everyday in which at first and for the most part we catch sight of beings, cope with them, suffer from them, and enjoy ourselves with them. The look into the light of the possible makes whatever is projecting open for the dimension of the «either/or», the «both/and», the «in such a way», and the «otherwise», the «what», the «is» and «is not». Only insofar as this irruption has occurred do the «yes» and «no» and questioning become possible. The projection raises us away into and thus unveils the dimension of the possible in general, and what is possible is in itself already articulated into possibly «being in such a way or otherwise», into the possibility of «being or not being». Why this is the case, however, we cannot discuss here. (GA 29/30, pp. 529-530; transl. pp. 364-365)

The thought of Schelling to which Heidegger refers here can be found in Schelling's work *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom* (*Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit/ Freiheitsschrift*):

The understanding is born in the genuine sense from that which is without understanding. Without this preceding darkness creatures have no reality; darkness is their necessary inheritance. God alone—as the one who exists—dwells in pure light since he alone is begotten from himself. [...] Thus we must imagine the original yearning as it directs itself to the understanding, though still not recognizing it, just as we in our yearning seek out unknown and nameless good, and as it moves, divining itself, like a wave-wound, whirling sea, akin to Plato's matter, following dark, uncertain law, incapable of constructing for itself anything enduring. But, corresponding to the yearning, which as the still dark ground is the first stirring of divine existence, an inner, reflexive representation is generated in God himself through which, since it can have no other object but God, God sees himself | in an exact image of himself. This representation is the first in which God, considered as absolute, is realized [*verwirklicht*], although only in himself; this representation is with God in the beginning and is the God who was begotten in God himself. [...] Because, namely, this being (of primordial nature) is nothing else than the eternal ground for the existence of God, it must contain within itself, although locked up, the essence of God as a resplendent glimpse of life in the darkness of the depths. However, yearning aroused by the understanding strives from now on to retain the glimpse of life seized within itself and to close itself up in itself so that a ground may always remain. Since, therefore, the understanding, or the light placed in primordial nature, arouses the yearning that is striving back into itself to divide the forces (for the surrender of darkness), while emphasizing precisely in this division the unity closed up within the divided elements – the hidden *glimpse of light* – something comprehensible and individuated first emerges in this manner and, indeed, not through external representation but rather | through genuine impression [*Ein-Bildung*], since that which arises in nature is impressed [*hineingebildet*] into her or, still more correctly, through awakening, since the understanding brings to the fore the unity or idea hidden in the divided ground. (SW VII, 358-360)

As a first approach: Schelling's *Freiheitsschrift* aims, as is well known, at a comprehensive and complete theory of human freedom. The core idea of the *Freiheitsschrift*, still different from Schelling's thinking in the years 1801 to 1806 – where the human being is only free insofar as he is in harmony with God, who is absolute freedom itself – is that the human being has a freedom for itself that can outrage against God. This is a novelty in Schelling's thought, and it is for this reason that so much space is given to the discussion of the relation of human to divine freedom in the *Freiheitsschrift* (cf. Hutter, 1996, pp. 80-183; Habermas, 1954, pp. 238-244, 313-314; Sandkühler, 1968, p.

194-195; Buchheim 1996, pp. 223-239). One of the first to recognise the significance of this is Martin Heidegger (cf. Sommer, 2015, pp. 189-244; 269-280; Hühn, 2014, pp. 16-34; Sikka, 1994, pp. 247-261), who also elaborated on it in his 1936 lecture *Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (GA 42).

As is well known, Heidegger studied Schelling's *Freiheitsschrift* intensively twice, in the summer semester of 1936 and in the first trimester of 1941. Schelling's treatise, is for Heidegger «the Peak of the Metaphysics» (GA 49, p. 1; transl. p. 1). Heidegger sees in Schelling's concept of freedom the determination of actual being, which transcends all human being. Schelling thus placed the idealist concept of freedom on a new foundation by including the human being. Because of the novelty of his questioning, it was later not possible for him to create his own work, despite numerous attempts, especially since the location of philosophy at that time «did not allow an inner centre» (GA 42, p. 5; transl. p. 3). Being is the fugue [*Fuge*] of ground and existence, and as their origin it «presences as [the] will» (GA 42, p. 235; transl. p. 135). In terms of the history of being, Schelling therefore belongs to metaphysics. That being as such is a *ὑποκείμενον* is true from Plato to Nietzsche and also concerns Schelling's interpretation of reason. That subjectivity qua selfhood is understood as «a representing relatedness back to the self» (GA 49, p. 162; transl. p. 162), has been a basic concept since modern metaphysics, also applies to Schelling's concept of existence. Therefore, Heidegger can see in Schelling's treatise on freedom the summit of metaphysics. What remains is only the «inversion» (GA 49, p. 89; transl. p. 89) by Nietzsche.

In his explication and reweighting of human freedom, Schelling poses the following thoughts, which are relevant for a contextualisation of the passage quoted above (cf. Schelling, SW VII, 360-362) and for Heidegger's reference here to Schelling, and form a proper panorama:

Spirit and nature appear as something that has analogous structures, not unlike the attributes of Spinoza's substance. Nature is conceived by Schelling as an absolute organism, which is always already presupposed by the differentiation into an organic and inorganic realm in appearing nature. And must thus be understood as an organism and is, for Schelling, a system in which the individual parts stand in a necessary connection. According to Schelling, it is in nature as an organism that the spirit [*Geist*] recognises itself. In Schelling's view, nature apparently has a conceptual predominance, since it initially appears, in relation to the empirically observable world, as unconscious, which then works its way up through numerous levels of development (potencies) to a state of higher complexity and thus to consciousness [*Bewusstsein*]. For Schelling, spirit and nature ultimately proceed from a primordial unity in an intertwined parallel manner and become one again in the end. It is wrong to say that nature becomes spirit. The absolute [*das Absolute*], of which nature and spirit represent two attributes, divests [*entäufeln*] itself, and in the course of this self-divestiture [*Selbstentäufelung*], the attributes are unfolded towards a future reunion. What belongs together merges. And that which divests [*entäufert*] itself, the absolute, is the actual ground of the observable world and, for Schelling, not the world itself. The evolution of the relations of spirit and nature is thus nothing other than the way in which the self-divestiture [*Selbstentäufelung*] of the absolute expresses itself. Nature and spirit, as attributes of the absolute, enter into an interrelated development. Central and final is the self-expression of the absolute. Nature glimpses itself in the human being, or more precisely: the absolute can successfully complete its self-explication in the human being and see it reflected, since nature has developed towards consciousness. The absolute carries out a self-analysis, by means of nature – an attribute of the absolute – itself. Nature achieves the highest goal of

becoming a complete object to itself only through the highest and final reflection, which is nothing other than the human being, or, more generally, what we call understanding [*Verstand*], through which first nature returns completely into itself, and through which it becomes evident that nature is originally identical with what is recognised in us as the intelligent and the conscious, Schelling will later argue in his *System des transzendentalen Idealismus* (1800) (cf. Schelling, SW III, 341). Although material nature may seem to develop parallel to the absolute, it ultimately unfolds within the absolute. Why does Heidegger refer to Schelling in his investigation of world-formation? What justifies his reference in this context?

Heidegger mentions the «glimpse of light» in Schelling as what Schelling sees in it, namely the core of consciousness that needs to be unfolded. Heidegger interprets the self-explication of the absolute in Schelling's *Freiheitsschrift*, which is provided with theological connotations, existentially as projection. Such a construction can certainly be found in Schelling himself and can be seen as very plausible. This can also be seen in Schelling's late works (cf. Zimmermann, 1996, pp. 330-339). Schelling himself formulates his original concern, which is best stated in the earlier text within the framework of the *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, in a rather ambiguous way in the *Freiheitsschrift*, because the absolute is now again assigned the name of God. In this way, the «glimpse of light» also corresponds to that which always appears from God, which in the end, in the midst of a complete enlightenment, leads human consciousness back to God. Reunification of self-contradictory identity, then, as the freedom scripture can certainly be read, also means return to paradise. This view, which is no longer contemporary today, can only be dispelled if one consequently retreats to concepts such as «the absolute» or «substance». Heidegger's reference to Schelling is justified by the fact that just as it is in the occurrence of projection in *Dasein* that the gaze into «the possible making-possible» [*Mögliche-Ermöglichende*] occurs in the first place – which makes the world and *Dasein* in its being possible in the first place – and which reveals the being of beings, so with Schelling it is human consciousness, or more precisely the understanding [*Verstand*], in which nature, as an attribute of the absolute, concludes and reflects itself and which thus allows the comprehensible [*Begreifbares*] and the individuated [*Individuelles*] to come into being in the first place. The «glimpse of light» in Schelling's work marks the self-explication of the absolute, and thus the awakening and reflection on nature and spirit and their reunion.

To return once again to Heidegger's thinking of world-formation: *Dasein* can take hold of possibilities, realise [*verwirklichen*] them and complement them, thereby essentially being there. The projection is thus essentially enabling and prefigures realisation [*Verwirklichung*]. In my opinion, the process discussed here can be better understood in this way: once again, the φύσις mentioned above comes into play. According to Heidegger's second interpretation, φύσις means «prevailing as such as the essence and inner law of the matter.» (GA 29/30, p. 47; transl. p. 31) Understood as the animating force [*belebende Kraft*] that moves matter [*Materie*] in a Aristotelian sense of movement. And characterised by Heidegger as the

whole prevailing that prevails through man himself, a prevailing that he does not have power over, but which precisely prevails through and around him – him, man, who has always already spoken out about this. Whatever he understands-however enigmatic and obscure it may be to him in its details – he understands it; it nears him, sustains and overwhelms him as that which is: φύσις; that which prevails, beings, beings as a whole. I emphasize once more that φύσις; as beings as a whole is not meant in the modern, late sense of nature, as the conceptual counterpart to history for instance. Rather it is intended more

originally than both of these concepts, in an originary meaning which, prior to nature and history, encompasses both, and even in a certain way includes divine beings. (GA 29/30, p. 39; transl. p. 26)

I would like to argue for the fact that this very «prevailing» – by which Heidegger refers to being itself – «the essence, the inner law of a matter» (GA 29/30, p. 47; transl. p. 31) opens its eyes, as it were, in the process of projection of *Dasein* and recognises that it is there. The process of projection in *Dasein* forms the Schellingian «glimpse of light» [*Lichtblick*], the «the open place in the midst of beings» [*offene Stelle*] (GA 5, p. 41; transl. p. 30) that has opened up in the realm of the closed beings. Without the projection of *Dasein*, φύσις, the «prevailing», the animating power, the being «of a properly primordial kind» (GA 29/30, p. 531; transl. p. 365) would be «mute»: it would indeed be present, but it would not be actively there, *da*. In the projection of *Dasein*, being of its «properly primordial kind» has broken through to self-visibility. It becomes the being of beings. Through this «glimpse of light into the possible», the dimension of «either/or», of «both/and», of «in such a way» and «otherwise», of «what», of «is» and «is not» is opened up to *Dasein* – the logos has sprung forth. The possibilities of admitting or denying, of concealing or revealing are present. How is this all connected to the world and world-formation?

«The *Dasein* in man *forms* world: [1.] it brings it forth; [2.] it gives an image or view of the world, it sets it forth; [3.] it constitutes the World, contains and embraces it.» (GA 29/30, p. 414; transl. p. 285), it says in *Die Grundbegriffe*. The *Dasein* in human being forms the world in that, *qua* binding holding itself in opposition to binding beings, it already complements these very beings with other beings to form a whole, and this even before all logical predication. Through the irruption of the ontological difference in the fundamental occurrence of projection, the world prevails as the being of beings as such as a whole. The world as the prevailing being of beings in the process of projection can act as such as a whole because the projection, through its structural moment of completion, has always already spread out a possible area – a «expanded breadth» (GA 29/30, p. 528; transl. p. 364). The occurrence of prevailing is the «essence» of the world (cf. GA 29/30, p. 509). The diversity of beings, as it oppresses and supports *Dasein*, is still preceded by the prevailing of the world itself as primordial law. In the projection, the world prevails by allowing the difference between being and beings happen, by allowing the being of beings to prevail as such as a whole. If the world prevails, then for Heidegger it prevails «*in and for a letting-prevail that has the character of projecting*» (GA 29/30, p. 527; transl. p. 362). Prevailing means the occurrence of the difference between being and beings and can be understood as that which makes beings into beings in the first place (cf. GA 29/30, p. 50). The difference is «never at hand, but refers to something that *occurs*.» (GA 29/30, p. 524; transl. p. 360) In other words: The dynamic prevailing of the world makes the difference between being and beings appear. In a sense, the projection is the medium in which the world can prevail. The world prevails in the projection of *Dasein*. However, it is evident that the projection must also be attributed an active role, since it reveals the being of beings and thus projects it. By projecting being towards the being of the beings – as the great horizon of understanding of all beings [*als großer Verständnishorizont alles Seienden*] – a projected space of possibility is formed: the world. Only the logos «*takes*» the beings as such as a whole out of its concealment and reveals it.

5. Final considerations

In the following, I would now like to relate the two Heideggerian concepts of world – being-in-the-world and world-formation, with reference to his two works *Sein und Zeit* and *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. First of all, the following difficulty emerges: if the term world-formation is not mentioned at any point in *Sein und Zeit*, the situation is similar with the term being-in-the-world in Heidegger's lecture treatise *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, which appeared two years later: being-in-the-world is not mentioned at any point in the lecture treatise. In addition, other elementary terms from *Sein und Zeit* no longer appear in Heidegger's lecture notes or no longer have the previous relevance and ubiquity. The following can be listed as examples: «state-of-mind» [Befindlichkeit], «disclosedness» [Erschlossenheit], «existential» [Existential], «thrownness» [Geworfenheit], «meaning» [Sinn], «care» [Sorge], «transcendence» [Transzendenz], «fallenness» [Verfallenheit], «understanding» [Verstehen], «worldhood» [Weltlichkeit] and «anxiety» [Angst]. If, then, substantial differences can already be found on a purely conceptual level, to what extent can the two different concepts of world find points of contact at all? Doesn't this make relating them to each other a hopeless endeavour? And more importantly, what is to be gained philosophically if it is nevertheless attempted and «forced»? These objections, which are not unjustified, can be countered as follows: despite the difficulties mentioned above, there are terms on the conceptual level that are conspicuously used in both works and occupy a similarly important position. For example, «as-structure», «logos», «(fundamental) attunement» are assigned important positions in both works. The two understandings of the world can be tailored to each other particularly well if we take a closer look at one concept: the projection. In *Sein und Zeit*, projection is negotiated as the constituting basic structure of understanding. Heidegger says of understanding:

With equal primordiality the understanding projects Dasein's Being both upon its «for-the-sake-of-which» and upon significance, as the worldhood of its current world. The character of understanding as projection is constitutive for Being-in-the-world with regard to the disclosedness of its existentially constitutive state-of Being by which the factual potentiality-for-Being gets its leeway [Spielraum]. And as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call «projecting». Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. (GA 2, p. 145; transl. p. 185)

As emerges from *Sein und Zeit*, the worldhood [Weltlichkeit] of the world ultimately knows itself to be grounded in the being of the concerned *Dasein*, its character of projection. In *Sein und Zeit*, it is true that *Dasein* is worldly [weltlich]. World becomes a moment of *Dasein* itself, an existential [Existenzial]. World is constituted by *Dasein* as the central possibility of the existence of the factual self. *Dasein* as being-in-the-world projects world in its understanding of being. For Heidegger, «understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a 'world', and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world.» (GA 2, p. 13; transl. p. 33) Worldhood depends on *Dasein* itself: «If no *Dasein* exists, no world is 'there' either» (GA 2, p. 365; transl. p. 417), notes Heidegger. Heidegger remarks in *Sein und Zeit*, *Dasein* thus not only project the potential «leeway» [Spielraum] (GA 2, p. 145; transl. p. 185), but also the worldhood of the world.

As it has been shown, in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, Part 2, the projection in *Dasein* is fundamental: unlike in *Sein und Zeit*, the projection is now explicitly related

to the projecting of world, through Heidegger's analysis of the process of world-formation. In the projection, the being of beings prevails as such as a whole of its respective possible bindingness. The world prevails in the projection. In the projection, the world prevails through the letting go of the difference between being and beings, through the letting-go of the being of beings as such as a whole. In this way, the projection becomes a specific unconcealment [*Entbergen*] in which the difference between being and beings opens up for the first time. Before all logical predication, the projection enables an «irruption» [*Einbruch*] into the «between» [*Zwischen*] of the difference between being and beings and thus makes it possible for these «distinguished in their distinguishability» (cf. GA 29/30, p. 529) to be distinguished. The unhiding of the enabling of the difference between being and beings guarantees *Dasein* ultimately «to take something *as* something»: the pre-logical «between» [*Zwischen*] becomes «as» [*als*] on the higher level of predication. If it was asked above what can be gained philosophically when a comparison is made between the two understandings of the world, then this seems to me to be reflected precisely in the parallelisation of the two concepts of projection. Despite all the aforementioned differences in the terminology of the two works, despite all caution against wild speculation, in my view it is precisely in Heidegger's conception of projection that there is an important and instructive commonality: in both works, projection makes world possible. If it is true in *Sein und Zeit* that the worldhood of the world is ultimately grounded in the being of the concerning *Dasein*, then in my opinion this refers to the central figure of thought in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*: world-formation. The fundamental occurrence of projection in *Dasein* forms the world through the unveiling of the being of beings, the ability to hold beings against itself in a binding manner and the complement. Worldhood, understood as a context of meaning [*Sinnzusammenhang*], as a structure of significance, which is inherent in the understanding of the meaning of *Dasein* itself, is constituted by precisely the three structural moments mentioned: 1. Worldhood is only through world-projection qua projecting of being (unveiling). 2. Worldhood is only through the being open of *Dasein* to the world, the holding of beings against itself in a bindingness (holding binding things against itself). 3. Worldhood is through the supplementation of beings to its worldhood (supplementation). As is true for *Dasein* in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, it is also true for the worldhood-constituting *Dasein* in *Sein und Zeit*: «a binding character prevails throughout all being related to..., all comportment toward beings [...] and completion» (GA 29/30, p. 525; transl. p. 361). According to *Die Grundbegriffe*, «[i]n projection world prevails» (GA 29/30, 530, p. 365) can apply in its worldhood. When it says in *Sein und Zeit*: «If no *Dasein* exists, no world is 'there' either» (GA 2, p. 365; transl. p. 417), this can be closely linked to Heidegger's statements «world only is what it is in [...] formation.» (GA 29/30, p. 413; transl. p. 285) and «[o]nly with *Dasein* does the world happen. *Dasein* breaks in and beings become manifest.» [*Mit Dasein geschieht erst Welt. Das Dasein bricht ein und Seiendes wird offenbar.*] (cf. Heidegger, 1991, p. 10) An even stronger accentuation of the commonality in the process of projection in *Dasein* in both of Heidegger's works is found when the focus is on the scope of possibility of *Dasein* itself, which is intertwined with the projection of the world: Not only is the projection of the world to be located in the fundamental occurrence, but by means of the projection, *Dasein* itself projects itself into a «being-there», *Da-sein* (cf. GA 29/30, pp. 526-531) qua its being suspended in «the dimension of the possible in general» (GA 29/30, p. 530; transl. p. 365), as Heidegger remarks at the end of *Die Grundbegriffe*. Thus, here too, as in *Sein und Zeit*, *Dasein* exists by «projecting» itself towards certain possibilities. Critically, five points can be made about *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*:

5.1 Problems within the nomenclature of the early Heidegger

It is very noticeable that Heidegger no longer resorts to the nomenclature from *Sein und Zeit* in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. Especially a consideration of the terms «disclosedness» [*Erschlossenheit*], «existential» [*Existential*], «thrownness» [*Geworfenheit*], «meaning» [*Sinn*], «understanding» [*Verstehen*] and «worldhood» [*Weltlichkeit*] could certainly have been very instructive. Why Heidegger refrains from using the term «being-in-the-world» in his lecture notes can only be conjectured: This could be connected, for example, with the fact that Heidegger wants to approach the question of world from a different direction this time, as he notes at one point, with reference to *Sein und Zeit*, in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (cf. GA 29/30, p. 262). Accordingly, methodological reasons would come into play why Heidegger renounces the term of being-in-the-world: Heidegger wants to approach the question of world by means of a comparative observation; moreover, the lecture does not focus on an existential analysis of *Dasein* and thus also on an investigation of the character of being of *Dasein* as a fundamental *existiale*. Instead, Heidegger's attention is focused on metaphysics as «as comprehensive thinking» (GA 29/30, p. 10; transl. p. 8), the related arousal of a fundamental attunement and the intended comparison. All this, however, does not seem to be a really satisfactory answer. What is decisive, in my opinion, is rather that Heidegger's sketch of world-formation as a fundamental occurrence in *Dasein* covers an essential structural moment of being-in-the-world: World (Likewise, one might consider whether Heidegger's discussion of boredom is precisely what gives the structural moments of in-being and self/*Dasein* their due.) As described above, it seems to me that the fundamental occurrence of world-formation is the enabling ground of worldhood. Understood in this way, Heidegger's elaboration of the «character of projection» would ultimately amount to a deepening of the structural moment of understanding [*Verstehen*] in *Sein und Zeit*. That Heidegger did not turn away from his motif of being-in-the-world even from 1930 onwards is evidenced, for example, by his work *Zollikoner Seminare* (cf. GA 89, pp. 204, 206, 237). A certain difficulty that already emerged in *Sein und Zeit* is also Heidegger's relationship to subjectivism in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*: although Heidegger makes it clear in his lecture notes that it is not the human being who forms the world, but rather *Dasein* in the human being, and with this approach he wants to forestall any subjectivity on the part of the human being, he nevertheless leaves open how the *individual* human being can arrive at a *subjective* conception of beings at all and how a common, social, forming of the world is possible at all.

5.2 Lack of reference to the work published shortly before, *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1929)

In my opinion, the fact that a reference to the essay *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (GA 9) is found only very rarely in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* should also be viewed critically. A reference is made in a brief recapitulation of the historical thoughts on the word «world» (cf. GA 29/30, p. 261), in Heidegger's preoccupation with the logos (cf. GA 29/30, p. 441), but not when it comes to the concept of world-formation. In *Vom Wesen des Grundes* we read:

«*Dasein* transcends» means: in the essence of its being it is *world-forming*, «forming» [*bildend*] in the multiple sense that it lets world occur, and through the world gives itself an original view (form [*Bild*]) that is not explicitly grasped, yet functions precisely as a

paradigmatic form [*Vor-bild*] for all manifest beings, among which each respective *Dasein* itself belongs. (GA 9, p. 158; transl. p. 123)

It is striking that Heidegger disregards this reference and, moreover, no longer thematises a «transcendence» [*Übersteigen*] in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. Why does Heidegger dispense with this? And is it possible to speak of transcending in the fundamental occurrence of world-formation? These questions cannot be discussed in detail here. We will merely refer to a passage in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*. There it states:

[O]nly when if this primordial history, namely, transcendence, occurs, i.e., only if beings having the character of being-in-the-world irrupt into the beings, is there the possibility of beings manifesting themselves. (GA 9, p. 159; transl. p. 123)

A correspondence with Heidegger's thinking of the projection, which interrupts into the «between» of the ontological difference of being and beings, thus unveiling the being of beings and thus advancing into «the dimension of the possible in general» (GA 29/30, p. 530; transl. p. 365) at all, seems conceivable to me here in any case.

5.3 Incompatibility of the concept of world-projection and thrownness

As was the case with his understanding of the world in *Sein und Zeit*, and as has also been discussed above, Heidegger seems to proceed primarily from a world-constituting *Dasein*. However, there is a passage in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* that is worth noting. It says: «thrown in this throw, man is a *transition*, transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence» (GA 29/30, p. 531; transl. p. 365). When «thrown» is mentioned here, it seems to refer to the projection of *Dasein* itself. There is no other mention of «thrown», «thrownness» or «mundane facticity» in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger was already able to put the mundane facticity, the thrownness of *Dasein*, only *conditionally* the fullest justification. It was shown there that *Dasein*, which creates the world, encounters the limits of its own sphere of action in the phenomenon of thrownness. It becomes aware of the ineluctability and inevitability [*Unhintergehbarkeit*] of its own projected world. It becomes aware of this thrownness, for example, through the attunement character of anxiety. The fundamental attunement character of anxiety brings, as we know, *Dasein* in its fundamental occurrence of projection to its limits. It makes *Dasein*, in its being-in-the-world, aware that it is, has to be and, as long as it is, must always seize possibilities, however these may turn out, and ultimately conveys to *Dasein* its mundane facticity: the fact that it has not always already projected the world, but is itself thrown into this encompassing, factual, ontic world in which it lives as *Dasein*. Proof of this can be found in *Sein und Zeit* in §40, where it says: «That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquillized and familiar is a mode of *Dasein*'s uncanniness, not the reverse. *From an existential-ontological point of view, the "not-at-home" must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon.*» (GA 2, p. 189; transl. p. 234) It follows from this that the «existential mode of being-not-at-home» [*existenziale Modus des Unzuhause*] forms the basis of the projected world itself. Ergo: the character of projection of *Dasein* as being-in-the-world is thus depotentiated. Heidegger's dominant concept of world-projecting *Dasein* as being-in-the-world, as he represents it in *Sein und Zeit*, reaches its limits with mundane facticity. However,

the character of projection of *Dasein* seems to dominate in *Sein und Zeit*, to the detriment of mundane facticity.⁷ And in my opinion, this very problem is repeated in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, without being resolved there: Once again, the world-projecting *Dasein* seems to dominate here, and the thrownness may at best still be hinted at in the analysis of deep boredom [*tiefe Langeweile*].

5.4 Lack of consideration of time, temporality and temporalizing

With the fact that Heidegger completely renounces the concept of transcendence, the talk of the «temporalize» [*Zeitigen*] in the fundamental occurrence of projection of *Dasein* also falls away. To be sure, the process of projection reveals a dynamic potential – how could it be otherwise imagined – but time [*Zeit*], temporality [*Zeitlichkeit*], temporalizing [*Zeitung*] no longer play a role in the fundamental occurrence of projection of *Dasein*, at least GA 29/30 Part 2. A prominent possibility for the position of time in the fundamental occurrence of projection would be that being in the process of world-formation is itself timed by the happening of ontological difference and, connected with this, also the being of *Dasein*.

5.5 Lack of consideration of the distinction between apophantic and hermeneutic as

It is noticeable that in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* Heidegger no longer seems to differentiate between an apophantic and a hermeneutic as, as he had done, for example, in *Sein und Zeit*. In *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, there is now only talk of the apophantic logos (cf. GA 29/30, pp. 448-449). If Heidegger still defined the «as» in *Sein und Zeit* as a hermeneutic expression of the «primordial ‘as’ of an interpretation (ἐρμηνεία)» (GA 2, p. 158; transl. p. 201) in distinction to the «apophantic as» of the statement, in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* it remains with the latter. Even though Heidegger does not speak of an «apophantic as» at any point, there are indications that the «as» can only be understood as an apophantic as: It only occurs when there is talk of the apophantical logos (cf. GA 29/30, pp. 448-449), it is «connected to the *assertion*» (GA 29/30, p. 484; transl. p. 332), it «points» [*weist*] to the primordial event of world-formation and it is the projection that allows the «as» to arise in the first place. If there is no mention of the hermeneutic as, this does not mean, in my opinion, that it plays no role in the lecture notes. Rather, it seems to me that there is talk of the pre-predicative, pre-logical hermeneutic as precisely when Heidegger is not yet moving *eo ipso* on the level of the apophantic logos. I would like to argue for the fact that the hermeneutic as possibly names precisely the «between» of the difference between being and beings that is made possible qua projection (cf. GA 29/30, pp. 529-530). What seems to me to speak most in favour of this thesis is the following passage in which Heidegger states:

For the «as» expresses the fact that beings in general have become manifest in their being, that that distinction has occurred. The «as» designates the structural moment of that

⁷ On the tension between the character of projection *Dasein* and mundane facticity, see for example Romano Pocai, „Die Weltlichkeit der Welt und ihre abgedrängte Faktizität“, in: Thomas Rentsch (Ed.), *Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit (Klassiker Auslegen, 25)*, Berlin: De Gruyter 2015, pp. 49-64.

originarily irruptive «between». We simply never first have «something» and then «something more» and then the possibility of taking something as something, but the complete reverse: something first gives itself to us only when we are already moving within projection, within the «as». (GA 29/30, pp. 530-531; transl. p. 365)

Hereby Heidegger seems to suggest that retrospectively the structural moment of the originally interrupting into the «between» can be understood as an apophantic as. *Before* predication, however, *Dasein* seems to move qua occurrence of projection already in the originally interrupting between, in the hermeneutic as.⁸

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⁸ In this interpretation, I am guided not only by the primary texts but also by two contributions: Lucilla Guidi, “As-structure (Als-Struktur)”, in: Mark A. Wrathall/Jeff Malpas (Ed.), *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2021, p. 64f. and Jeff Malpas, “Between (Zwischen)”, in: Mark A. Wrathall/Jeff Malpas (Ed.), *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2021, pp. 119ff.

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